Holly Bensur, Senior Marketing Manager at BPC:
Hello, and welcome everyone to our Twitter Spaces on how recent banking sector instability affects housing affordability. Dennis, feel free to take it away.

Dennis Shea, Executive Director of the Terwilliger Center for Housing Policy at BPC:
Thank you, Holly. Good afternoon, everyone, and thank you for joining the Bipartisan Policy Center on Twitter Spaces. My name is Dennis Shea, and I am the Executive Director of BPCs Terwilliger Center for Housing Policy. Today we're talking about the recent instability in the banking sector, and how it may affect the housing market, as well as the Terwilliger Center's work and the work of others who are seeking to improve housing affordability. There have been three bank failures in the United States over the past month, including that of Silicon Valley Bank, which I understand was the second largest bank failure of all time. And facing financial trouble, the huge investment firm Credit Suisse has just been sold at a massive discount to its rival UBS. Some analysts are concerned the problems in the banking sector may spill over into the housing market, particularly if more bank failures are on the horizon. So, how does the current situation compare to the 2008 financial crisis, where we witnessed the meltdown of the US housing market? Or for comparative purposes, should we look a little further back in history to the SNL crisis and the dangers of borrowing short, and lending long? I can't think of two individuals who are better equipped to help us understand this complicated picture than our guests Mark Calabria and Aaron Klein. Mark is a senior advisor at the Cato Institute where he co-founded the Center for Monetary and Financial Alternatives. He is also the former director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency and has previously served as chief economist to Vice President Pence and as a senior aide to the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs. Aaron is a Senior Fellow in Economic Studies at the Brookings Institution. Prior to joining Brookings, he directed BPCs financial regulatory reform initiative. Before that, he served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic Policy at the Treasury Department. And as Chief Economist of the Senate Banking Committee. Gentlemen, it's great to have you both with us today on Twitter Spaces.

Mark Calabria, senior advisor at the Cato Institute and former director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency: Such a pleasure to be here, Dennis.

Dennis Shea:
Great. Well, let's start with the big question. You know, with the question that's on everyone's mind. We're not looking at a repeat of 2008, are we?

Mark Calabria
I hope not. I don't think so. This is Mark. I don't think so quite yet. I mean, the number of institutions that have gotten into trouble, you know, while Silicon Valley Bank has half a dozen or so problems, most

institutions only have one or two of those problems. So, I think the failures we've seen so far, you know, again, share some commonalities, but they really are outliers so far.

Aaron Klein, senior fellow in Economic Studies at the Brookings Institution:
Yeah, this is Aaron, and I would agree with that. Look, in 2008, we had a financial product, toxic mortgage--secure mortgages, that underlay a really broad swath of activities and actions that infected the entire financial system. What you have that sort of these banks are a little bit different when you have some idio—

Dennis Shea:
Still there, Aaron?

Aaron Klein:
Signature? Yeah, can you hear me? Yeah, you have some idiosyncratic crypto exposure at places like Signature and Silvergate Bank, and then you have some crazy [inaudible] at places like Silicon Valley Bank, which, you know, had some really large unhedged product. So, does the interest rate risk exist in other institutions? Yes. At this level? Doesn't look like it. The early analysis says not. But you know, we do need to wait and see a little bit. But I kind of share Mark's broad view that this is not 2008, Redux.

Dennis Shea:
And would you say in 2008, really the issue, as you mentioned, Aaron, was one of, you know, of bad assets, poorly underwritten or not underwritten mortgages, as opposed to short-term liquidity problems. Maybe both of these occasions involve bad risk management--poor risk management.

Aaron Klein:
So, I agree with that, except this wasn't really a liquidity issue. And it's one of the reasons why the regulator's got it wrong. Look, the assets that Silicon Valley Bank held were liquid, they were GSE securities, basically, when we could all get three and a half--or all, when a lot of Americans had access to mortgages at three and a half and 4%--Silicon Valley Bank ended up owning them. They didn't originate them, they didn't make them, they don't--because that bank didn't really lend to people, right? It lent to big tech firms. But they bought these assets. And as interest rates rose, their value went down. So it's not that the assets were bad from a credit risk, or that they were illiquid, it's just that they were worth a lot less money. And that took away their equity, as a bank.

Mark Calabria:
So that's an important point that Aaron makes, which is again, Silicon Valley Bank was essentially functionally economically insolvent. And that was really the trigger of the run. I think we should also keep in mind that, by the time September 2008, came around, we had already suffered a couple of million in job losses. And I do think it's important to keep in mind that as long as we're in an

environment where there's positive job growth, it's pretty hard to have a meltdown in the economy, when you're creating jobs. And I do say that, you know, if you want to kind of know what the canary in the coal mine is going to be in terms of the financial sector, let's keep an eye on the job market. And that is important. We're in a different economic environment than we were in September 2008.

Dennis Shea:
Well, thanks to you both, we can all take a sigh of relief that this is not 2008. You kind of mentioned it before, but could you just you spoke a little bit about--both of you spoke a little bit about Silicon Valley Bank. Do they face different financial challenges from, say, Signature Bank and First Republic Bank, who also failed? Are there different financial challenges that they experience?

Mark Calabria:
To degrees? I mean, certainly they were all, to varying degrees, heavily reliant on uninsured depositors. Certainly, they all had some degree of unrecognized losses on securities, but, they deferred and then to some extent, you know, and we're still, in my view, learning a lot about Signature that, you know, that we don't know yet in a way that I think we do know, with Silicon Valley Bank. And so, we didn't see real losses in the commercial property book yet at Signature, but there may be some instances and again, the New York financial regulator shut down Signature. So again, while we've learned things from the federal regulators, I think there's still other information we need to get from the state regulators before we have a full picture.

Aaron Klein:
Yeah, yeah, I would just add, look, you can learn a lot by a bank bite size, there are lots of $200 billion banks, which is roughly the size of Silicon Valley and First Republic. Those banks that are like Main Street banks or bank people have about 1000 branches. M&T in the East Coast, Fifth Third in the Midwest for folks listening. Signature Bank had 12, 16 branches according to the Federal Reserve. According to my own research, that that number is closer to four. There's a miscounting between offices and branches that are irrelevant at a large number. But if you wanted to walk in and meet a teller, I think there are only four places you could for Silicon Valley. First Republic has 72. So it's much more similar to SVB than it is to M&T or, you know, Fifth Third, or what we would call often in the banking world, large regional banks. So, these are not banks that bank people, they're banks the bank business, right.

Mark Calabria:
Yeah, absolutely.

Dennis Shea:
Well, let me talk about people. I mean, there's been a lot of speculation about the degree to which credit could tighten, could continue banking sector instability, cause banks of all sizes to pull back on making residential mortgage loans, vis-a-vis other types of lending.

Mark Calabria:

Mark again. I think one thing we're almost certain to see is that, certainly, the regulators, to some degree have kind of been a little embarrassed by this, fair to say, you know, particularly, you know, the Federal Reserve. And, you know, historically, if the regulators look like they weren't on the job, then there's a tendency to overcompensate in the other direction. So, you know, I think with a high degree of certainty, we're gonna see a lot more regulatory scrutiny on regionals, and even some larger community banks. And I think that that's going to see a little bit of a credit tightening. Probably, you know, residential, multifamily construction, construction loans writ large, even some mortgage lending. But I do think we're going to start to see a little bit of a credit contraction coming from regulatory scrutiny. And again, the question is really, what's the extent of that?

Aaron Klein:

So Mark, and I can agree on the outcome, but disagree on the means. I do think there's going to be, I do think there's going to be a credit contraction, how much is unclear. Part of this has to do with, money is going out of the banking system, and it's moving from the banking system into money market mutual funds. Now, why is it moving into money market mutual funds? Those aren't guaranteed at all, whereas at least banks have $250,000 of deposit insurance, and arguably, there's now been an implicit increase. Well, part of the problem is money market, mutual funds have been bailed out repeatedly by the Federal Reserve. Whenever there's an economic unforeseen problem, as in the 2008 crisis, or under the guise of COVID relief, money market, mutual funds, either fund the government, and a lot of that money ends up back at the Federal Reserve in their RP facility, or in Treasury bonds, maybe some of it goes back into housing through GSE debt. It doesn't fund--what the money--and some fun large corporations some money market mutual funds fund large corporations and corporate paper, which is a type of debt instrument that only the biggest of the biggest of the big guys use. By moving money out of the banking system and into money market mutual funds, you're tilting the playing field of credit, away from small businesses, away from consumers, and to government and large businesses. But I don't think this is through regulation, which is going to be very slow-moving, or even through structural requirements to try and clean up some of the possible failure problems at these institutions. I think a lot of it is the reaction to the various bailout systems, and the movement of money by depositors who hadn't been paying the attention to their bank that they should.

Mark Calabria:

I do want to add, I actually do agree with that. So, you know, my regulatory point was really more an add on. On top of that, and I really should also add remind folks, in the 12 months before these banks failed, you had almost $800 billion in deposits leave the system overall. And part of this, of course, to remind everybody, we saw almost $5 trillion in deposits come into the banking system during COVID, you know, from a base that was $13 billion. And some of this is, of course, the guarantees on mutual funds and other things, but a lot of it is just the differences in spread. So, you know, how many people

really want to keep their money in a checking, in a credit account and an interest account that pays pretty small, when you can get what 4% in three month T-bills? And so I would say a conservative estimate would be that over the next 12 months, all else equal, even with stability in the banking system, that I would expect about a trillion dollars in deposits to lead the system, if nothing else, because of arbitrage and interest rate spreads.

Dennis Shea:
Wow. So how I mean, how is that going to affect mortgage lending? I mean, the fact most people don't understand that non-banks are the largest originators of mortgages today, as opposed to what we commonly consider a bank. I mean, what do you think about mortgage lending, generally, going forward?

Mark Calabria:
I mean, it is important to keep in mind, however, that while non-banks are the biggest originators, you know, it does take 30 to 90 days for a non bank to sell that loan to Fannie, Freddie, or to have a Ginnie securitization. And in that window of time, they are heavily reliant on warehouse loans from depositories. So one question will be, do we start to see disruptions, you know, from the depositories resulting to contraction of wholesale bending to the non-banks? That's one feature you gotta watch.

Dennis Shea:
Aaron, you want to weigh in a little bit?

Aaron Klein:
I mean, look, I think Mark has a has a pretty good answer into that world. And, you know, I think what we need to remind ourselves is, the banks that have failed weren't making mortgage loans. They were buying mortgages, in the case of Silicon Valley Bank. They weren't actually originating them. And so the question, then, I think, is more of the banks that have seen money come in or out as their customer bases changed, how is that going to react? The only point, final point I make is there's a paradox. The turmoil in the market has led to a flight for safety and quality, which should, all else be equal, lower mortgage rates. So ironically, I think we're gonna find cheaper mortgage rates as a result of the financial instability created from these crises, which, which could move things in the other direction.

Dennis Shea:
Interesting, very interesting.

Mark Calabria:
If I can add some caveats to that. I mean, I think we are going to see cheaper rates, but I think you're going to see conditions of getting mortgages tighten. So, it certainly can be cheaper rates, but perhaps less availability. The one wrinkle, I would say on the lending side, of course, is, I mean, Signature was

one of the biggest multifamily lenders. I know we've focused mostly on the single-family side, but Signature is a very big player in the New York, you know, apartment market, very big player in the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit market, First Republic, a little bit of footprint in that market, too. You know, so, certainly, obviously, Flagstar has bought that and Signature, and we expect there to still be continued apartment lending in the New York area. But again, a lot of deals got disrupted. You know, the question about, you know, whether regulators--again, I say this, because we still don't really know what the state of New York was seen within Signature--you know, were there problems in the multifamily book that they were aware of? I personally think we're getting pretty close to overbuilt in the multifamily market. So I do think that given these lenders' role, some of these lenders roles, rather, in the multifamily market and the tax credit market, there could be disruptions there. But again, it's too soon, it's too soon to tell.

Dennis Shea:
Yeah, I guess, as I understand it, over the past 20 years, Silicon Valley Bank was responsible for more than $2 billion in investments to support affordable housing in the Bay Area. So that's obviously been disrupted to some extent.

Mark Calabria:
And again, unlike Signature where most of that multifamily portfolio has been picked up by Flagstar, it's not clear what's going to come out of that with Silicon Valley Bank. So, you know, again, if you're the tax credit space, and you're in the multifamily space, this is something you may be concerned about, and should keep an eye on. And maybe more importantly, as we saw post-2008, you know, there were a couple of years--I can't remember where Aaron and I are, we're still in the hell at this point--where Congress converted the tax credit into a grant because so much of the tax credit market is dependent on bank profitability. And so, if there is a big hit, to bank profitability, there'll be a contraction in investor interest in the tax credit--in the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit.

Dennis Shea:
Okay. I think I was reading in the Journal today about huge transfer of funds from regional banks to "too big to fail" banks. So what impact does that have on home builders, many of whom rely heavily on the regional banks for construction loans?

Aaron Klein:
Yeah, look, I mean, I think there's a real kind of deep irony here, which is that if you think about it at a 30,000-foot level, the massive growth in technology and the returns to economy of scale, and securitization, etc., create a much cheaper world for folks who need credit within the credit box. And if you exist, just on the margins, or outside of that box, you don't benefit from it, if you're in the box, you do, right? So, you know, Class A properties, giant loans, etc., you know, mortgages on the consumer side, for the folks that need the stuff outside, America's small and regional and community bank

network provides tremendous value. And it's a comparative advantage that our economy has that other countries in the world don't. And to the extent money and deposits flow out of those banks, and into the larger banks, who, generally speaking, focus more on their comparative advantage within the box, that can create some changes to tilt the allocation of capital in society. To the extent that the larger banks see this new money, and then see opportunities to move, and expand their different business models, that can push against that same phenomenon. So you know, a little bit of an issue, too soon to tell, as you see these situations in terms of where the money is moving and where it isn't, which is why kind of focused on the larger movement of money from the banking system to money market mutual funds, or outside of the banking system. And this question is really diving into flows of funds changing within the banking system.

Mark Calabria:
And let me really echo that, I mean, Aaron has really touched, I think, on a critical point here. And, you know, while we have standardized, you know, essentially the residential mortgage side, you know, acquisition development and construction lending is bread and butter for community banks, and they are really the primary source. And it's actually been one of the things I think that has constrained construction for much of the Great Recession. We lost something like 6000 community banks after 2008. And again, they were the primary source of where a home builder goes to get lending. And so I do worry about, you know, is that segment gonna take a hit? You know, we have not standardized that in the same sort of way, that residential construction. And so, if we lose that segment of it, I think that's going to be very difficult for the mortgage market. And so it is an area where yes, too soon to tell. I will add, you know, the banks that did fail had a heavy reliance on uninsured deposits. And as a plus, your typical community bank, your typical bank under like a billion has very few uninsured deposits. They tend to run like, maybe, at most, 5%-10% of their deposit base. If you think about it Silicon Valley Bank was like the mirror, 90% of its deposits were uninsured. Whereas for the typical, again, community bank, 90% of its deposits tend to be insured. So hopefully, it's not too much of a negative effect. But certainly one of the things I'm keeping an eye on and concerned about, is this impact on acquisition development, construction lending.

Dennis Shea:
Interesting. You know, as--you kind of mentioned this before, Mark, about the regulator's missing the mark, I mean, it became clear as interest rates increase that the banks had market losses that they were not accounting for in their hold-to-maturity portfolio. So I'd like both of you to sound off on how and whether and how the regulators missed the risk this posed to the banking sector, and what do you expect lawmakers to do in response?

Mark Calabria:
Aaron, do you want to jump in?

Aaron Klein:
I'm happy to jump in.

Mark Calabria:
Go for it.

Aaron Klein:
Look, most of the time, when banks fail, there's a lot of finger pointing, because there're multiple regulators. The bank has a regulator, the holding company has a regulator, the affiliate, blah, blah, blah. For Silicon Valley Bank, the Fed regulated head to toe. And it it may have accounted for things, but the accounting was transparent. It was out there in the call reports. The Wall Street Journal had a story about it five months ago on the front page. Tt was an outlier among its peer group, it had all of these losses, and the regulator allowed them to have them be unhedged. And you know what's great about under hedging your risk? When it's paid off, you do great. Their stock price tripled in value, and on the way up, I bet everybody got--a lot of people got rich. And then poof! Interest rates rose, unhedged risk, they expose, bank fails. Now you see, you know, the Federal Reserve in their testimony talking twice about social media and zero times about the bank holding company that they were supposedly regulating. Right. So the finger pointing has begun. And if you can't point fingers to the other regulators, you point them to amorphous concepts, like any, like corporate treasurers were listening to random people with blue checkmarks on Twitter, as opposed to emails from their venture capitalists, which is really what kind of sparked the immediate flame that brought it down. So regulators were completely asleep at the switch. There's some deep structural problems that need to be asked at the Fed, starting with the San Francisco Fed, and the fact that the CEO of Silicon Valley Bank was on the board of directors of the San Francisco Fed, and going all the way down. I'm very, I think, I have very low expectations for the Fed's internal report. Scandals that engulfed and caused the resignation, or in the case of the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, the FBI indictment of their president, the Fed has never uncovered anything of significance in those prior internal investigations. So you know, it's, I have low expectations for what the Feds internal investigation is going to is going to produce in this instance, as well.

Mark Calabria:
So let me start out by saying that, even though Aaron and I have occasionally been on different sides of the aisle, wow, I don't think there was a word that I disagreed with. I mean, that was dead on target in terms of the Fed's responsibilities. So let me add to a couple of, really just add, I'm not going to subtract anything. First of all, you know, obviously, regardless of how bad the regulatory system was, blame always, first and foremost starts with management. So I don't want anything--and I know Aaron feels the same way--so nothing that anything we're saying is meant to take the mistakes of management off the hook, at any of these institutions. I will take, you know, I think maybe a counter, you know, counter the conventional wisdom view to say, I am thankful that uninsured depositors forced the closure of a

bank that was insolvent. And that probably would have been another six to 12 months before digging a deeper hole before regulators actually acted. So I recognize there's a kind of narrative out there that, you know, those horrible Twitter depositors. No, they, they did us all a favor, because that bank needed to close. And the regulators did not look like they were doing it, and again, I believe the hole would have been deeper. Obviously, I would have preferred it had been done perhaps a little, little more, you know, cautiously. But again, the bank needed to be closed, that's an important part. Dennis, you raised the question of legislation. I mean, we have a divided Congress. You know, while you know, I'm personally against raising the deposit insurance cap, because I believe you need to have uninsured depositors, occasionally, you know, pushing institutions into closure. But that said, there certainly is a bipartisan, broad interest in raising the cap. That said, you know, a number of Republicans in the House have come out against it, I think it's increasingly likely that you would see a clean increase, so, you know, so a number of progressives would likely ask the regulatory reform to be attached to it. So I would give maybe a 30% chance that in the near term, you see any sort of increase in the deposit insurance limit. Of course, it's also important to keep in mind that there has never been a temporary increase in the deposit insurance limit that didn't become permanent. And again, I think that would be a step in the wrong direction. I don't think there's a broad amount of agreement. You know, I mean, Aaron, and I could probably agree on a bill that could come together, but we probably couldn't get Congress to pass it. You know, I would probably take, you know, reduce their Fed's role and move some of its regulatory responsibilities elsewhere, but I think it's extremely unlikely to happen. So far, the Biden administration has not put out calls for regulatory reforms. So I would have to say at this point, I think legislation's highly unlikely except for a few things like going after, you know, the executives. There'll be some fairly small ball stuff that can get done. But I don't I don't expect to Dodd Frank point two. There doesn't seem to be the momentum for that at this point.

Dennis Shea:
So, Aaron?

Aaron Klein:
So Mark and I agree on so much that folks ought to be concerned. I will say, the Biden administration did call for legislation to increase clawbacks and penalties. I mean, the fact that the Federal Reserve approved the CEO selling $3.7 million of stock in the first quarter of this year when the bank was obviously way out of its skis, if that doesn't make your blood boil, then you're in the wrong Twitter space. I also oppose raising the deposit insurance cap. Largely because 98% of Americans are already covered by this. As a proud progressive who believes in the New Deal, FDR was only interested in protecting the ordinary American family here, not, you know, corporate--corporations in this space. And I fear that, you know, look, all institutions let us down. Mark's right to start with management, right? Bond holders, uninsured depositors stayed in there for a very long time. So did--credit rating agencies gave them a good bill. Their auditor gave them a clean bill of health, their regulator said they were fine, right? So the question becomes, when every institution is failing, do you say "Oh, well, if we just put

more of our faith in making us smarter as one of these institutions smarter, we get it?" Or do you say, "we need to just accept failure as a normal thing, and then readjust our society." And if that means that, you know, Roku, when they put 40 or $50 million in a bank has to actually have one of their employees look at the bank periodically and say, "Hmm, this bank looks a little bit sketchy. Maybe we should switch banks." That's a better system for society in the long run, than if all of us on this Twitter space have to pay more for our basic banking, so Roku doesn't have to put any check. And any dollar amount you put on deposit insurance isn't--isn't going to move the needle for the business accounts, which is what you're talking about, unless you want to make businesses unlimited. Right? The 10 largest businesses at Silicon Valley Bank had $13 billion in deposits. Is that who we're talking about? Too often, you see this guy's under small businesses. And it reminds me during COVID, when the LA Lakers qualified as a small business for PPP, because, you know, basketball teams only have 15 players! I don't think the LA Lakers are a small business! But by many definitions, they legally are. And when the government hands out free money, usually there's a line for that, regardless of whether or not it makes sense.

Dennis Shea:
I will note, Aaron, that your Twitter photo has the words “the moral hazards,” so I just will note that for the audience.

Mark Calabria:
Aaron’s 100% right about that. You know, the system should be able to withstand, you know, these bank failures. And I’m frustrated when I hear the Fed say “the system’s strong and resilient,” but the same system can’t withstand a handful of billionaires taking a 10% haircut on their uninsured deposits. You know, I do want to say, maybe having been a financial regulator, it is sometimes tough, overwhelmingly tough for frontline examiners. And I think one of the things that came out of the hearing this week is that there were people inside of the Fed for a while who were seeing these problems. And I think it’s often pretty tough for that stuff to get to the top. And we can criticize the system, but I think to me, I take the system for how it is, which is, even when problems are spotted, it just takes so long for an adjustment. And ultimately what we need to have is a system where an institution like Silicon Valley Bank can go down without a problem. And again, you know, I’m very skeptical that this was a systemically important institution, and I think we need to learn more about what drove the regulators to decide that this was a systemic risk exception? What was the thinking? They need to show their homework, and I don’t really feel like they did after this week. I don’t really think I learned anything that made me any more convinced after this week’s hearings that these were systemically important institutions that need to be rescued.

Dennis Shea:
Thank you, Mark. I mean, Mark, we would be remiss not to mention your new book, *Shelter from the Storm,* which recounts your experiences and decisions at the FHFA responding to the pandemic. The

book also discusses some critical lessons for future crisis responses. So, any words of wisdom to share in light of recent events?

Mark Calabria:
Well, I think it's actually great timing, even though it's only been out two weeks. I really wanted to write about how we went through the near-financial crisis of March 2020, and how we tried to keep, you know, families in their homes, and how we could resist bailout. So to me, I think it gives you a lot of insight of what it's like to kind of be in the seats some of the regulators are in right now, and maybe how they could make different choices. I'll lastly say, my biggest pet peeve is when people tell me things need to be done, this institution needs to be rescued, that needs to be rescued. No, these were all choices, and I think folks need to defend their choices. I hope the current group of regulators at some point in the future write out, and tell us why they made the choices they did. What I do in this book is walk you through the choices I made, the tradeoffs, the uncertainties, and try to give you a sense of what it's like behind the curtain.

Aaron Klein:
Let me just add: I read Mark's book, it's fantastic, everyone here should read it. Because we'll never know what would have happened if Silicon Valley Bank had been made to fail. Right? I can tell you that I firmly believe Roku would have still made payroll, and I would still have been able to watch "Ted Lasso" last night, [inaudible] by the way, right? But, truth be told, you know, other people say, you know, small businesses would have been—disaster, systemic run, blah, blah, blah. Right? You never know the counterfactual. Mark's book is a look at how one person facing made a decision. A decision that angered a lot of people, that didn't provide a bailout, and—we know—the world moved on. Right? Mortgages were services, the predictions of disaster didn't come to be. And so, it's very, for all of us, I have a lot of sympathy for the people in government, a lot of respect, I know the current people, mostly personally, very well. They're honest, very smart, seasoned people, making judgement calls. You can disagree with their judgement but still respect their integrity and their decision-making process. But Mark's book is a rare opportunity to see what happens when a person chooses not to hit the bailout button, and I can think of no better time to read that book and then start wondering, you know, what that alternative would have looked like.

Dennis Shea:
Well, thank you, Aaron, and thank you, Mark. This has been a great conversation, and I want to thank everyone who participated. You can follow me, our expert panelists, and the Bipartisan Policy Center on Twitter, or visit our website at bipartisanpolicy.org for the latest updates on the Terwilliger Center and our efforts to improve housing affordability. That wraps it up. Again, I want to thank Aaron Klein and Mark Calabria for really a great conversation today. So, have a great day, everyone. Bye bye.