A Comparative Context for U.S. Housing Policy:
Housing Markets and the Financial Crisis in Europe, Asia, and Beyond
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AUTHORS
Ashok Bardhan, Fisher Center for Real Estate and Urban Economics, University of California-Berkeley

Robert Edelstein, Haas School of Business, University of California-Berkeley

Cynthia Kroll, Fisher Center for Real Estate and Urban Economics, University of California-Berkeley

DISCLAIMER
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Executive Summary

This paper compares housing markets and housing finance institutions around the world to better understand how economic, historical, regulatory and institutional factors influenced national economies and global housing markets during the financial crisis.

By reviewing a range of country settings and experiences, we seek to highlight significant characteristics of the U.S. housing market and finance system. The U.S. mortgage system is complex, compared with systems in other countries. It offers a wide range of loan choices for borrowers and a variety of capital sources for lenders. About two-thirds of U.S. households own their homes, similar to rates found in many other parts of the world, but the U.S. government’s role in housing production is relatively small. The U.S. housing finance system stands out for having a mortgage interest tax deduction, a relatively high proportion of long-term fixed rate loans, no fees for mortgage pre-payment, and a predominance of non-recourse loans (mortgages secured only by the house and not the borrower’s other assets).

Examples from Across the Globe

European countries illustrate the range of housing market experiences in the context of the forces that brought on the U.S. housing and financial crisis. The German housing market – with a homeownership rate of only 43 percent, extensive social housing, limited homeownership subsidies and shifting demographics – showed little growth or price declines over the past decade. In Germany and Denmark, covered bonds provided a steady source of credit for home purchases while limiting leverage and other types of risk.

The housing boom in the U.K. had features similar to the boom in the U.S. (e.g., self-certified loans, buy-to-let lending), but the aftermath was less severe. Government intervention to shore up troubled banks and help struggling borrowers, in some cases through new rental arrangements, was swift. Ireland’s housing boom and bust – made worse by massive capital inflows, trade exposure and negative real interest rates – came closer to matching the U.S. experience in severity. Spain was severely hurt by economic linkages to other countries, mostly in the form of foreign demand for vacation homes, and by risk taking on the part of small local savings institutions.

The Asian countries reviewed in this paper avoided the typical full boom-bust cycle. Continuing economic stagnation in Japan caused virtually no significant volatility in that country’s housing market. The impact of the financial crisis on Japan came instead through the severe contraction of international trade and the negative shocks felt through global credit markets. China and Singapore used government control and land ownership to alternately dampen surging prices or stimulate the market, sometimes with little success.
The gap between incomes and home prices appears to be growing in China’s many metropolitan areas, and pent-up demand and cash-rich state enterprises have further fueled the boom.

Australia and Canada have had more conservative mortgage systems than the U.S., and both responded quickly to the financial crisis. Australia, entering the crisis with a fiscal surplus, was able to quickly guarantee deposits in a banking system with no deposit insurance, while Canada’s restrictive banking/financial system kept the country from participating fully in the subprime bubble.

**Findings and Conclusions**

Most of the issues and factors emphasized in this review of 15 global housing markets are country- and institution-specific and should be understood in that context. Different country’s experiences highlight the trade-offs between tightly regulated markets, which may offer stability, and more dynamic and flexible systems that may be riskier but provide opportunities for efficiency, innovation and growth. Additional findings emerge from this review:

- Global linkages can amplify effects, either through financial markets or trade.
- Small, early interventions helped some housing markets mitigate the impact of the crisis.
- Conservative lending practices and effective regulation and enforcement dampened boom and bust tendencies in several markets.
- No country is immune from irrational exuberance, but institutional memory of previous housing bubbles and financial crises helped several countries avoid repeating the same mistakes in the recent boom and bust period.
- Household risk sharing through full recourse mortgages, prepayment penalties and the absence of mortgage interest deductions dampened upswings but may lower the homeownership rate and household mobility.
Introduction

The housing market turmoil that began in the U.S. in 2007 shows little sign of abating. It led to a financial crisis that subsequently spread to the rest of the world, triggering aftereffects that are still being felt today. Combined with long-term budgetary issues at the national, state and local levels, the weak economic recovery has raised questions about the underlying structure of the U.S. housing market and the basis for current U.S. housing policy. What aspects of the U.S. housing market allowed these problems to develop and fester? What role did U.S. housing and financial policy play in the crisis, and what aspects of policy worsened or eased the extent of the crisis? What is the appropriate and optimal government role in housing and housing finance?

The U.S. was not alone in facing a housing bubble and an ensuing financial meltdown. A comparison across countries during this turbulent period reveals that housing prices escalated in many countries during the first decade of the 21st century. Ireland and Spain, for example, saw dramatic price increases; in contrast, the German housing market remained steady. A few countries experienced housing bubble collapses similar to the U.S. experience, but several others seem to have weathered the storm (at least so far) with a slow leveling off of prices. In some national markets, prices continue to soar. Housing has not been the only vulnerable economic sector worldwide. As soon as the initial troubles in the U.S. housing market spread to the financial sector, the contagion propagated rapidly across the world, affecting such far-flung countries as Singapore, New Zealand, Iceland, the U.K., Germany, France and Ireland, as well as, to a lesser degree, some fast-growing emerging economies.

This paper compares the U.S. experience with that of other countries to better understand how housing markets work, how different types of housing institutions and regulatory structures may have contributed to the housing boom and bust, and if these examples might inform future housing policy in the U.S. The backdrop of the financial crisis helps bring out differences and commonalities in markets and institutions across the world. The countries studied are broadly representative, with examples from every major continent and from the most significant housing markets.

We use this approach to analyze how the housing and financial crisis affected countries worldwide, while also taking into account the importance and impact of local characteristics of housing markets. The institutional structure of housing markets and the policy domain in most countries is national, as was the political and economic response to the crisis. Market demand and supply are determined by demographic and socio-cultural factors, economic conditions and level of development, and by the functioning of national institutions, local jurisdictions and the financial system. Within the U.S., a look at the housing experience by state and by metro area underlines the diversity of housing markets at the sub-national
Housing prices in California, Arizona, Florida and Nevada doubled or more than doubled between 2000 and 2006, and then fell by 35 percent or more by 2011. Other large markets saw more modest gains and losses (for example, New York) or very little loss at all (for example, Texas). Michigan, which had been struggling with long-term economic problems, experienced relatively weak housing price gains during the “bubble” period, but steep losses once the recession began. The differences among these markets can be explained by many factors, including demographics, income levels, economic growth and job creation, financial resources, land-use regulations/ restrictions, and incentives.

Local housing markets, however, were also influenced by global economic and market conditions, as well as by policy decisions that were taken at the national level. Investment by sovereign funds, especially from China, in U.S. agency securities contributed to low mortgage interest rates during the housing boom. Foreign investment in local markets helped drive housing prices in areas as diverse as Vancouver, Shanghai and Spain. A country’s vulnerability to the global financial crisis was directly related to the level of integration of local banks with the global financial markets, the proportion of mortgage loans originating from foreign institutions or denominated in a foreign currency, and the dependence of the local economy on global trade and investment flows.

Furthermore, the settings in which housing markets evolve are shaped not just by history and economics but also by regulatory policies. Both regular long-term policies and emergency, reactive, short-term policies can determine the pace of construction and home
sales, mortgage availability, price trends, affordability (in both ownership and rental housing), and the market’s reaction to sharp economic reversals. The wide range of social, economic, political, cultural and institutional settings and experiences worldwide before, during and after the recent financial crisis provide a type of proving ground for different institutional structures and policies.

We begin by laying out different elements of the housing market from the supply and demand side. We then describe, in broad terms, the variation that exists across countries in housing characteristics, regulatory framework and financial structure. Next, we provide detailed examples of specific housing experiences in different countries, describing how this experience was manifested in the recent financial crisis. We synthesize these practices and their fallout into a set of observations on how housing markets operate and on the effects of different types of interventions. Finally, we conclude with a few words on the relevance of these observations for the U.S. housing system.
Basic Elements of the Housing System

Figure 2 provides a schematic view of the housing system in a typical country. Demand is primarily based on household formation, wealth and income, demographic mix (age distribution, marital status, family/household size), labor mobility, and lifestyle issues/cultural mores (whether extended family or primary family unit households are the norm, for example). Resources available to homeowners, prospective homeowners and investors are further affected by the mortgage credit system, capital markets for mortgages, explicit and implicit subsidies and the taxation system.

![Figure 2. Schematic View of the Housing Market](image)

On the supply side, housing may be provided by the private sector or the public sector. Construction costs (labor and material), land costs, land-use restrictions and financing costs will all affect housing construction. These factors, in turn, are affected by the broader economy where material and labor costs are influenced by broader demand for products locally, nationally and even globally, as well as by financial markets and the regulatory and institutional setting.

The functioning of housing markets relies critically on how efficient the financial system is in channeling national and international savings into mortgages and into construction and
development loans. Mortgage markets and secondary capital markets, through their impact on cost of funds, affect the behavior of homeowners, developers and builders, as well as real estate investors, and determine housing supply and demand.

The public sector may play a role at various stages and in different elements of the housing supply chain. Government may be directly involved in building homes. It may provide subsidies either on the demand side (e.g., tax deductions for interest payments or rental subsidies) or on the supply side (e.g., tax credits for building affordable housing). National, state and local governments control the types of housing built (through building codes) and the location and number of units in any geographic area (through land-use controls). The public sector also helps determine the type of financing available through bank regulations, regulation of other financial players, regulation of the capital markets, and support of public-sector secondary markets or capital market enterprises.

Overview of Global Housing Markets

Table 1 provides an overview of the housing market in the U.S. and in 15 other countries. The U.S. is among the largest housing markets in the world, with over 130 million units in 2009. Only China and India have more housing units. In most countries, the majority of units are owner-occupied. The U.S. is no exception: about two-thirds of occupied housing units were owner-occupied in 2009. This is similar to levels in the U.K., Australia and Canada; somewhat higher than in Germany, Denmark, Korea and Japan; and lower than homeownership rates in Serbia, Singapore, Spain and Ireland.
The national government plays a large role in supplying housing in some countries, but not in the U.S. Most housing construction in the U.S. is undertaken by the private sector. Some affordable housing is built by the private sector with government subsidies or incentives, but even accounting for this contribution, the government has a hand in less than 10 percent of total housing stock.8

While the private sector is primarily responsible for housing supply in countries like the U.K. and the Netherlands, these countries still provide a larger component of publicly built social housing than do the U.S., Canada or Australia. In formerly socialist Eastern European countries (and the formerly socialist eastern part of Germany), most of the housing stock may have been built and owned by the public sector historically, but it is now largely in
private hands. China has also moved away from state-provided housing and state-owned housing construction companies to a more market- and private sector-driven approach. In contrast, Singapore’s government continues to be heavily engaged in managing the housing market through its dominant role in housing development, land use and control, housing allocation and housing finance.

Finance and Mortgage Systems

The U.S. mortgage system is one of the more complex financing systems in operation around the world, offering a wide range of choices for borrowers and a variety of capital sources for lenders. Some institutional and operational characteristics of the U.S. system are shared across countries, while some are unique to the U.S. or to just one or two other countries. In some cases, the U.S. has been seen as a leader in new product innovation, with institutions and practices that are worthy of emulation.

THE U.S. HOUSING FINANCE SYSTEM

Government policy has been a major driver of mortgage markets in the U.S. The Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) was established as a public entity in 1938 to provide mortgage lenders with access to capital markets. It became a publicly held shareholder company chartered by the U.S. government in 1968. Congress created the Federal Home Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) in 1970 to provide services similar to those provided by Fannie Mae. The Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae) was established in 1968 as a government-owned corporation to provide mortgage guarantees. This, in turn, enabled loans to be pooled and repackaged into securities (securitization), which was important primarily for loans to low- and moderate-income borrowers. Ginnie Mae has remained a government-owned enterprise throughout its history, while Fannie and Freddie came under government conservatorship in 2008 when the financial and housing crisis brought them to the brink of failure. During the housing boom, the private sector role in securitization grew in scope and complexity. Many products were issued that did not conform to standards set by the government-sponsored enterprises.

A typical home loan in the U.S. may have either a fixed- or variable-interest rate. Mortgages are generally secured by the property’s value alone. Should the borrower default, the lender does not have the right to claim the borrower’s other assets. The loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, though set individually for each mortgage, has been historically influenced in the U.S. by the level required for government guarantees or securitization by U.S. government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs). For many years, the GSEs required an 80 percent LTV level for securitizing “conforming” mortgages (those that conform to GSE guidelines). Higher LTV ratios were permitted to make homeownership more available to low- to moderate-income borrowers through targeted federal financing and loan guarantee programs. Innovations in securitization and mortgage design that appeared to allocate the risk more effectively (i.e., riskier, higher-yielding securities to risk-loving investors) allowed lenders to originate higher interest rate loans at higher LTV ratios. Monetary policy, which kept interest rates extremely
low between 2001 and 2007, made it even easier for the housing and financial bubble to grow.⁹

In sum, the U.S. financial market system operates through a combination of private business practices, public regulations and public-sector support for private-sector activities. Although most housing finance comes from the private sector, the institutional framework in which this occurs is heavily influenced by public-sector policy. Less direct public-sector measures also affect borrowing costs. One significant borrower-friendly policy allows homeowners to deduct their mortgage interest from their income taxes for loans of up to $1,000,000, significantly reducing costs, especially to borrowers at higher-income levels.

**COMPARATIVE FINANCE SYSTEMS**

Many countries also use means other than direct involvement in housing production and supply to manage the housing market. Much of this activity centers on the finance sector, which indirectly influences housing demand and supply. Table 2 summarizes characteristics of housing finance systems across the same set of countries.
## Table 2: Comparative Data on Housing Finance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Loan-to-Value Ratio</th>
<th>Variable or Fixed Rate (Majority)</th>
<th>Mortgage Deductible</th>
<th>Fee-Free Prepayment</th>
<th>Government Guarantee or Mortgage Insurance</th>
<th>Capital Market Role</th>
<th>Recourse or Non-Recourse</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>Variable</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Partial; full from mid-2011</td>
<td>For lenders</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Recourse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>Short-term fixed</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>CMHC</td>
<td>Moderate, government presence</td>
<td>Recourse</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>Variable</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Insurance required for HPF loans</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Loans linked to compulsory savings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>Variable</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Covered bonds</td>
<td>Recourse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>Variable with fixed limits</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Covered bonds</td>
<td>Bonds</td>
<td>Recourse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>On the cards</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>Recourse</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>90%+</td>
<td>Variable</td>
<td>Yes (five years)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>Variable 44%; Hybrid 31%; Fixed 25%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>For some lenders; most no</td>
<td>JHF (GHLC until 4/2007) 35% of loans</td>
<td>REITS, JHF (GHLC until 4/2007)</td>
<td>Recourse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>50-70%</td>
<td>Variable</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Recourse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>Fixed</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>Government loan guarantees</td>
<td>Small OTC</td>
<td>Recourse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>60-70%</td>
<td>Mostly fixed</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>Being established</td>
<td>New since 2000</td>
<td>Recourse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>Variable</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Under-developed</td>
<td>Mostly recourse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>Variable</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes, after teaser period</td>
<td>Insurance mandatory for public housing purchase</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Both; non-recourse requires co-borrower</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>70-80%</td>
<td>Variable</td>
<td>Only for low income as of 2011</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Covered bonds 64%; ARM 36%</td>
<td>Recourse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>Short-term fixed, then turn variable</td>
<td>No*</td>
<td>Yes, if rate not discounted</td>
<td>Insurance available for mortgage</td>
<td>Grew 2000-2007; now negligible</td>
<td>Recourse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>80-90%</td>
<td>Both, currently mainly fixed</td>
<td>Yes*</td>
<td>Primarily; details vary by state</td>
<td>Multiple agencies involved</td>
<td>Highly developed</td>
<td>Non-recourse</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Capital gains tax limited.

Source: Modified from Exhibit 1 in Bardhan, Edelstein and Kroll, Editors 2011.
The U.S. has a wider range of financing options than most of the other countries we examined. The long-term fixed-rate mortgage, for example, is rare in much of the rest of the world. Only in the Netherlands was it the primary mortgage instrument of choice. The majority of the 15 countries in our comparison used variable-rate mortgages. Fixed terms were generally offered for a much shorter time period (one to five years), even where they were available. Mortgage interest is deductible from income taxes in only four of these countries: India, Denmark, the Netherlands and, for five years, in Ireland.

Loan terms are often stricter in other countries. The U.S. was the only country of those studied where the majority of loans were non-recourse (protecting the borrower’s other assets in the event of default). Loans are full recourse in the European countries. In China, loans are linked to compulsory savings and retirement fund schemes, giving an added incentive to stay current, while in Singapore, there is a similar link to provident fund savings and non-recourse loans require a co-borrower. Many countries allow lenders to charge penalties when loans are prepaid. In the U.S., Federal Housing Administration (FHA) loans as well as Fannie and Freddie conforming loans are largely set at fee-free prepayment; prepayment fees on other loans tend to be set at the state level, with prepayment restrictions more likely to be found on non-conforming subprime loans.10

Many governments support mortgage lending through various types of mortgage insurance programs or by offering covered bonds. Governments participate much less in secondary markets, and in some countries the secondary capital markets for mortgages are much smaller relative to the lending pool than in the U.S. Thus, lending institutions are more likely to hold the loans they make.

Comparative Housing Systems and the Crisis
Comparing the experience of different countries during the global financial crisis helps illustrate how market, institutional and regulatory factors in different settings may influence housing market growth and economic outcomes following distress.11 We divide the discussion in this section by geographic region.

EUROPEAN HOUSING SYSTEMS
Figure 3 shows indices of house price trends in five European countries between 2004 and 2011. This figure should be used as a general illustration of the differences, rather than as a set of precise numbers. Different data sources on price trends in global markets show variable and inconsistent price levels and trends, even from the same source measured in different years. This figure draws from several years of reports from a single institutional source (the European Mortgage Foundation). Although exact values vary, the broad relative trends over time are consistent. We use the experiences illustrated below as a starting point for discussing how the European housing markets responded during the run-up to the boom, how they experienced the bust, and how local demographic and economic factors and the institutional and policy context contributed. Our discussion of each of the countries shown in Figure 3 begins with Germany, which showed no evidence of a housing bubble,
and follows sequentially in roughly increasing order of severity. We conclude with Ireland and Spain, which had the most extreme evidence of housing bubbles.

**Figure 3. Housing Price Index Levels**  
**Selected European Markets 2005-2010 (2004 = 100)**

![Housing Price Index Levels](image)

*Source: European Mortgage Foundation*

**Germany**

The German experience is unique in that the country did not display the rapid housing price growth seen in most of Europe during the mid-2000s. Indeed, some sources show price declines even during this period of robust housing markets globally. Two factors appear relevant here. First, Germany underwent an earlier period of home price gains just prior to, and immediately after, reunification when subsidies and incentives caused a boom. However, once reunification was established and an expected economic surge in Berlin failed to materialize, home prices began a gradual downward slide. Thus, buyers likely did not expect large increases in home prices and equity gains. Second, the rate of homeownership in Germany is far lower than in most other parts of the world. Government programs designed to stimulate the housing market are largely oriented to rental housing, particularly the social housing component. The reasons for this are many. As Voigtlander points out, “... the situation in Germany is primarily due to four factors. First, rental housing makes up a larger share of the market because of an extensive social housing sector. [...] Second, homeowners in Germany did not benefit from the same high subsidies as in countries such as Spain or the Netherlands. Third, the German rental housing market was not rendered inoperative by excessive interventions in rents, as was the case in countries..."
such as Spain and the UK. Finally, German house prices remained stable over a long period of time.”

German demographics have not been conducive to healthy price rises. Furthermore, underlying capital for mortgages is tied to covered bonds that include strict requirements for LTV ratio, interest rates that may vary only within fixed limits, and loans that are full recourse. These factors made borrowers less likely to take out loans they could not afford and therefore less likely to default on their mortgages or face the financial strains that affected many U.S. borrowers at the height of the subprime bubble. Nevertheless, the German economy has not been immune to the financial crisis. German banks that invested in high-risk U.S. mortgage securities suffered significant losses, and Germany’s dense foreign trade and investment links to other countries made it susceptible to external shocks. At the same time, the entire European economy and banking system, including Germany’s, have been affected by the sovereign debt problems of some of the smaller EU countries.

**Denmark**

Housing prices in Denmark increased strongly during the boom but fell much more moderately during the financial crisis and later. Gyntelberg et al. report a drop of 20 percent from 2006 to 2009, while the European Mortgage Foundation data show a decline closer to 16 percent, with a slow price recovery following 2009.

The Danish mortgage system is based on banking regulations that require the matching of cash flow from mortgages to the bonds used to finance the loans. The term of the loan also matches the bond term. There are no penalties for prepayment and the borrower may either (a) buy back the loan by purchasing the corresponding bond on the secondary market and delivering it to the bank or, (b) assign the loan to a new purchaser. Until about 2005, the great majority of loans were long-term fixed rate. By 2010 almost 90 percent of new and two-thirds of outstanding residential mortgages were long-term adjustable-rate mortgages, with rates adjusted in one-year intervals at the time of refinancing the underlying bond.

From the bank’s point of view, this financing option involves matching cash flow from loans with interest payments on the bonds used to fund the loans. For example, one-year adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs) are funded by issuing one-year noncallable bonds, and there is a one-to-one match of interest period on these bonds with the interest period of one year for the homeowner. This creates a natural interest-rate hedge for the mortgage bank.

During the financial crisis, government guarantees helped stabilize Denmark’s bond market with the result that bonds were issued during a period when most credit markets came to a standstill all over the world. Although borrowers faced falling house values and the number of homes with LTV ratios greater than 100 percent grew during the downturn, the default rate was quite low. Gyntelberg et al. offer several reasons for this low default rate, in addition to the existence of emergency measures. Bond requirements and mortgage regulations limited lenders’ ability to liberalize loan practices (Denmark has no subprime market). These regulatory policies also constrained hyper-securitization and the proliferation.
of derivatives. The full recourse nature of Danish loans discouraged borrowers from taking out loans they could not afford or defaulting on underwater mortgages. The country’s strong welfare programs, which helped replace income for the unemployed and provided social housing for those who could not afford to participate in the private market, also helped shore up the housing market indirectly.

United Kingdom

The run-up to the housing bubble in the U.K. was similar to the experience in the U.S., but the aftermath has been less severe. Pryce and Spriggins highlight this similarity, noting the expansion of cheap credit brought about by, among other things, the burgeoning securitized lending sector. This led to the growth of speculative, buy-to-let mortgages. At the same time, the welfare system was reformed in ways that weakened the safety net for low-income borrowers.

In contrast to the U.S., the U.K. had two earlier boom and bust periods in housing prices during the 1970s and 1980s. However, other features bear significant similarities with the U.S. experience. Like the high-priced coastal markets in the U.S., the U.K. has significant supply constraints that result from local land-use controls. In addition, financial deregulation allowed the expansion of lending to a broader group of borrowers. Whitehead and Scanlon argue that price gains were in line with fundamentals until about 2005, but that a price surge in the next two years reflected a change in the borrowing community. When lending peaked in 2007, 46 percent of loans were “self-certified” (similar to low doc/no doc loans), and buy-to-let lending (i.e., to investors rather than homeowners) had also increased rapidly. Prices dropped in the U.K. but stabilized quickly. This may reflect the fact that prices had not soared as far from fundamentals as in the U.S., but also that bank and national policies minimized foreclosures. Social housing providers initiated rent-back programs that allowed troubled borrowers to stay in their homes. Monetary policy initiatives, investments in social housing and tax relief were all steps taken by the national government to cushion the recession’s effects.

Ireland

The impacts of the financial crisis were more severe in Ireland than in the U.K., with bank failures accompanied by large declines in home values. The country’s housing boom started long before the more common price rise between 2000 and 2007. Historically a country with a declining population and labor force, the offshoring of technical manufacturing and services operations from the U.S. and membership in the EU brought new opportunities to the economy. In the 1990s, Ireland’s foreign direct investment-led technology and economic boom took off, and housing prices increased together with jobs and incomes. Much of the increase during this period was in direct response to economic growth. Ireland’s “new economy” grew more slowly following the dot-com implosion, but home prices continued to rise through 2006.

Stevenson attributes this later phase of price growth to a credit bubble, which gave Ireland negative real interest rates for much of the period and allowed the housing sector to
drive growth in the economy despite a slowdown in other sectors. Indeed, up to 20 percent of GDP in this period came from the real estate industry as a whole.\textsuperscript{19} Lending standards were liberalized and many U.S.-like loan features appeared (e.g., teaser rates, LTV of up to 100 percent). As in the U.S., a series of factors fed into each other and built up once the housing market began to slow: declining building activity, lower prices, lower lending, banking losses and contagion effects. These problems were made worse by Ireland’s position in the Eurozone, which gave the country limited tools in terms of a flexible monetary policy once problems emerged. As Conefrey and Fitz Gerald\textsuperscript{20} point out, inclusion in the Eurozone relaxed financial constraints and, initially, the housing sector responded to demographic needs in countries such as Ireland and Spain, with their demand backlog for desirable housing stock. The boom soon turned into an unsustainable bubble, however, and the consequences are now reflected not only in home price declines but also in serious unemployment and fiscal problems.

**Spain**

International linkages played a significant role in the severity of the housing and economic boom and bust in Spain. EU membership and a growing economy led to housing price increases beginning in the mid-1990s. Housing market expansion after 2000 was largely driven by speculation on the growth of international demand, especially from other Europeans seeking vacation homes. Between 2000 and 2009, five million housing units were added to an existing stock of 20 million, while the population grew by only 6.5 million.\textsuperscript{21} Small savings institutions, which had been the major mortgage lenders for individual borrowers, moved into the business of financing real estate development and the construction of large multifamily projects. These loans became the most problematic ones during the downturn. As in parts of the U.S., real estate development itself was an important driver of employment growth, and the effects of the real estate downturn were felt in national employment figures, as well as in real estate asset prices and in the financial sector. Like Ireland, Spain had no monetary policy options, but the government stepped in with loan modification measures, deferred mortgage payments for the unemployed, and temporary fiscal stimulus measures. However, longer-term fiscal concerns may limit further action.

Overall, several observations sum up the European experience:

- Countries with restrictive mortgage finance systems (lower LTV ratios, restrictions on innovative mortgage products) experienced less severe housing market volatility and disruption.
- Quick action to stabilize the banking system, support borrowers and maintain mortgage credit systems helped minimize foreclosures and stabilize prices.
- The recent housing bubble was not a unique experience. Germany’s earlier bubble around reunification left it somewhat immune to the tempting “expectation” effects in the most recent boom and bust. Previous bubbles in the U.K. left an institutional memory in the public sector that informed response efforts in the most recent crisis.
• The combination of strong unemployment insurance programs and social housing alternatives kept several countries from experiencing the full spillover effects of the housing bust, despite their participation in the bubble.

• In some countries, full recourse, prepayment fees and the absence of mortgage interest tax deductions may have reduced the temptation for households to treat housing as a speculative investment.

• The global nature of the financial system added to individual countries’ vulnerability. Banking systems experienced stress more quickly where they were reliant on global credit markets, as well as in countries where mortgages were taken out in foreign currencies.22

ASIAN HOUSING SYSTEMS
Housing market data for many Asian countries are more sparsely available than data for the U.S. or European countries. From available information, it appears that while some countries saw significant price fluctuations, countries in Asia have not had the full boom and bust experience that was observed in the U.S. and several European countries (see Figure 4). This in no way implies immunity from such cycles. Many parts of Asia experienced a real estate bubble sometime in the past two decades. Real estate bubbles in Asia were linked to the financial crisis that affected the region in 1997, as well as the experience of the Japanese economy beginning in the late 1980s and early 1990s.23,24 Indeed, given extremely high price-rent ratios, as well as price-income ratios, some countries may be in the midst of a bubble as we write. The experience across countries is quite diverse, but a few examples highlight some of the underlying characteristics. Our discussion of Asian countries below focuses on their housing market experiences, as well as on their institutional characteristics, which in some countries allow for much closer government tinkering with housing market variables than is found in the U.S. or Western Europe.
Japan

Japan had a large real estate bubble that peaked in the early 1990s. The collapse of real estate prices contributed to prolonged economic stagnation and to the restructuring of the financial sector. The Government Housing Loan Corporation, which had historically accounted for up to one-third of housing loans in Japan, was affected by government privatization policies after 2000. Contrary to the general trend in Japan, where public-sector debt grew relative to private-sector debt, housing mortgages have shifted from the public to the private side. Private banks now hold a much larger share of mortgages than the restructured public provider, but their role has not been enhanced by a robust capital market. With tightly restricted real estate capital flows, weak demographics, a continued lack of confidence and a still sputtering economy, the Japanese housing market seemed immune to the global effects of the housing bubble. One data source shows housing prices dropping for the entire period, while another shows housing prices growing very little from 2000 to 2007 and declining slightly during the world financial crisis. Instead, Japan experienced the global economic bust through the severe contraction of international trade and the negative shocks felt through global credit markets. Continuing economic stagnation made the economy particularly vulnerable. Seko, Sumita and Naoi argue that Japan may need to loosen its financial restrictions to provide greater flexibility in the housing market.
China

In China, the government owns the land and plays the dominant role in controlling and managing housing finance, housing supply and ownership. National and municipal governments have used this authority to micromanage housing and financial markets. As housing prices have surged in China (prices more than quadrupled in Beijing between 2004 and 2009, for example), authorities at the national and local levels have adjusted land supply, access to mortgages and permission to purchase property alternately to cool and stimulate markets. Nevertheless, the gap between incomes and home prices in the most expensive metropolitan areas is growing. The price-to-income ratio in Beijing surged from nine in 2003 to 18 in 2010, and from 10 to 13 over the same period in Shanghai. Wu, Gyurko and Deng have calculated that even small declines in expected appreciation could lead to immediate price reductions on the order of 40 percent – indicative of a bubble that could easily burst. Although access to financing is much more restricted than in the U.S. and many European countries, much home-buying activity is financed privately by personal savings. Given the link between urban development, municipal finance and state ownership of land, city governments have played an important role in boosting the land prices that underlie housing cost by parlaying land development fees into major urban infrastructure projects. Wu et al. point out that the public sector has also had a hand in housing price appreciation in certain cities: some state-owned enterprises, controlled by the central government and flush with funds, have been active in land markets, probably adding to land price increases.

Most recently, the Chinese government has recognized that the substantial rise in housing prices over the past decade has made homeownership less affordable (or out of reach), particularly for the lowest-income groups. In response, the Chinese government in its latest (12th) five-year plan set a goal to construct 35 million housing units for low-income households. This is an explicit recognition that the housing boom and bust in China have left the lower end of the income spectrum with little hope of homeownership – absent assistance from the central government.

Singapore

In Singapore, 80 percent of the housing stock (whether renter- or owner-occupied) is dependent on the activities of the government-controlled housing agency (Housing and Development Board [HDB]) and the Social Security system (the Central Providence Fund [CPF]). Indeed, the Singapore government plays a dominant role in that country’s real estate markets generally, and in the housing market specifically. The HDB builds, owns and/or sells houses to a substantial number of first-time homebuyers and others in Singapore. A Singaporean citizen purchasing a home can borrow against his Social Security (CPF) account for financing. The private ownership-residential market – the 20 percent that is not subject to direct government control – is the move-up market. In Singapore, the housing market has been sensitive to economic fluctuations, but the results have been moderated by government intervention. Recently, the country saw high home price
appreciation before and after the global financial crisis, with a swift yet temporary downturn during the crisis.

**India**

Among all large Asian countries, India’s financial system is the one most closely modeled after those of the U.S. and Europe, but it has been tightly regulated, and the country has a much less developed secondary market than in the U.S. Also, as an Asian country at an earlier stage of development, home purchases are more dependent on personal savings and other sources of capital outside the banking system, with mortgages playing a major role only in large urban areas and for a relatively small segment of the population – primarily middle-class professionals. Chandrasekar shows that the number of housing loans dropped sharply between 2004 and 2008, but prices in 2009 were above 2007 levels in Kolkata (up 85 percent), Mumbai (up 26 percent), and Delhi (up 13 percent after prices rose 30 percent in 2008 and then dipped in 2009). Relaxed monetary policy and a fiscal stimulus helped the Indian economy and real estate market weather the effects of the global financial crisis on trade flows, capital availability and exchange rates. Pent-up demand may continue to help absorb the higher-priced housing, yet in the longer term the housing market is still vulnerable to price inflation diverging from rental and income fundamentals.

The experience of Asian housing markets, although specific and idiosyncratic, underscores some additional issues while re-emphasizing or de-emphasizing some of the conclusions that might be drawn from the experiences of European countries:

- The effects of a real estate market collapse can be long term and pervasive, particularly where the connections to the larger financial system are diverse, numerous and intricate. In Japan, the aftereffects had long-term implications for economic growth. Further, the broader lessons of previous downturns and crises seem to have stemmed speculative activity in the countries most affected by the Asian crisis of the late 1990s.

- In Asia, financial systems tend to be fairly restrictive, conservative and limiting in terms of the amount of speculative finance built on mortgages. Where bubbles appear to be emerging (as in China), housing is often purchased through alternate financing sources such as personal savings, profitable enterprises looking for diversified investments, or local governments.

- The emerging Asian economies, in particular, share a number of traits regarding housing and its larger role in society and the economy. Housing is seen as a hedge, an insurance policy against inflation and the uncertainties of economic life. Lacking a range of investment alternatives, housing is also viewed as a tangible asset where savings can be parked over the long term. Rental insecurity for contractual reasons and the socio-cultural significance of “owned” homes are also behind the inordinate home price levels, relative to incomes, that are seen in these countries.
• National control over land and financial capital, although a powerful tool, is not necessarily effective in managing housing price fluctuations. Even more importantly, it is a tool that is highly susceptible to short-term manipulation by vested interests.

OTHER EXAMPLES
Canada and Australia offer a different kind of contrast and some similarities to the housing market structure and recent experience in the U.S. The two countries have a number of things in common: both have large resource-based sub-regions with connections to fast-growing Asian economies and to other countries that have been particularly prone to housing price booms. Neither Canada nor Australia, however, experienced the expansive lending activity that occurred in the U.S. And both developed quick responses to temper the impacts of the global financial crisis.

Australia

Australia’s economy is closely tied to the major Asian and Pacific economies, and these links have influenced the degree to which Australia has been affected by the global financial crisis. Housing price trends vary significantly by region. The highest level of appreciation occurred in the resource-based region of Perth, which experienced substantial economic growth due to exports to China and a near doubling of home prices between 2004 and 2007. In all five major Australian cities, prices fell briefly in response to the crisis but were higher again in 2010 than in 2007. Nationwide, prices grew by about 11 percent between 2004 and 2007, and by 15 percent from 2007 to 2010. Compared to the boom in the U.S., this growth was relatively modest but it has been steady and is still continuing.

Australia and the U.S. differ in the operation and structure of their housing and housing finance sectors. Murphy\(^37\) indicates that home building in Australia is generally done on a contract rather than speculative basis (i.e., the construction takes place on a pay-as-you-go basis) through the development of individual sites earmarked for individual consumers. The Australian banking and mortgage system is unusual in that borrowers, rather than the banks, carry most of the risk.\(^38\) The great majority of mortgages have adjustable rates with very short adjustment terms, and loans are full recourse. The mortgage market was liberalized in the 1990s with wholesale brokers taking up about 15 percent of business and borrowers being offered a greater array of products. Nevertheless, subprime products never became a significant part of the market.\(^39\)

Australia had no deposit insurance until September 2008, when the government instituted 100 percent deposit insurance as an immediate response to the financial crisis. In addition, Australia used its budget surplus to quickly invest in a fiscal stimulus, keeping unemployment below six percent – a strategy that has also supported house prices. However, the continuing, steady rise in home prices and the heavy investment of bank portfolios in mortgage loans raise questions about the country’s financial stability going forward.\(^40,41\)
Canada

Despite its proximity to the U.S., Canada’s housing market trends have been in some ways more similar to those of Australia than to those of its close neighbor. Like Australia, Canada’s housing markets vary widely by region, with some of the highest price gains occurring in natural resource-exporting regions.\textsuperscript{42,43} The country as a whole saw annual price gains ranging from five percent to just below 10 percent from 2004 to 2007. Prices continued to rise in 2008, with a very modest downturn of two percent in 2009. However, resource-exporting regions, which had seen gains of more than 40 percent in some years, began to see annual declines of 10 to 15 percent in 2009.\textsuperscript{44}

Canada’s financial system has been much more conservatively managed and regulated than the U.S. system. Mandatory mortgage insurance, less reliance on “creative” instruments (including subprime mortgages), and a conservative banking culture that limited leverage all helped prevent many of the problems experienced in the U.S.\textsuperscript{45,46} Canada experienced no free fall in prices and no significant escalation in mortgage defaults or bank foreclosures. No banks failed during the crisis. This stability is partly due to a different institutional framework for state involvement and greater public tolerance for an active state role. Brean et al. attribute Canada’s relatively safe navigation through the crisis to more effective regulation; strict, self-imposed limits on bank leverage; much stricter limits on unconventional mortgages; and less reliance on “creative” investment vehicles (e.g., subprime lending) and structured products. Yet concerns remain about the long-term possibility of economic fallout from the financial crisis on Canada’s economy and unemployment.

Canada and Australia provide two illustrations of how housing markets have fared under somewhat more restrictive mortgage financing conditions and with quick government intervention at times of crisis. These strategies do not, of course, eliminate the possibility of local housing bubbles. Both countries experienced large home price increases in boomtown regions where the local economy was growing rapidly. These increases are clearly subject to reversal should export demand for minerals and other natural resources begin declining. In both cases, the national government pursued a strategy that was effective in keeping regional booms from spreading and in allowing modest adjustments in the face of external shocks.
Concluding Remarks

Our review of international experience in the recent worldwide financial crisis illustrates how local economic, national-institutional, and global financial forces shape housing markets. Different institutional structures, regulatory settings, economic conditions, global connections, demographics and political factors combine to determine the vulnerability of housing markets to domestic and international shocks, while also influencing the nature, direction and robustness of the policy response. Most of the issues highlighted and factors emphasized in this comparison are country- and institution-specific, and should be understood in that context. Given the range of conditions and outcomes experienced worldwide, it is clear that no one optimal and preferred structure exists for financing or providing housing. However, the examples described in this paper suggest which tools have worked well and which are risky, albeit in their respective settings, and illustrate some broader choices in housing policy.

We conclude with several general findings from this cross-country review:

- Global connections can amplify effects. Especially for smaller economies, extensive participation by foreign financial institutions in the mortgage market, significant foreign capital flows, and even (albeit to a lesser degree) intensive trade links can freeze the financial system or adversely affect employment and GDP growth in the event of a global downturn. Even in the U.S., the priming of the housing pump came partly from foreign investments in U.S. mortgage products. And the exposure of foreign investors meant that the collapse of the U.S. subprime market had global repercussions.

- Small but early interventions by authorities in some countries kept some housing markets from reaching the crisis stage, avoiding the need for more expensive and heavier intrusions later.

- Conservative lending practices, a strong regulatory structure and effective enforcement mechanisms dampened housing booms and busts in several markets.

- Quick, decisive governmental responses were able to avert the worst of the impact in some settings. Timely anticipatory guarantees were effective in diverting panic (Australia) but were less effective when applied reactively to problems that were already emerging (as with the U.K. banking crisis).

- In no country are asset prices immune from irrational exuberance, inflamed “animal spirits,” and runaway contagion. However, institutional memory can make a difference. Several researchers credit policies put in place following the 1997 Asian financial crisis with dampening prospective bubbles from 2005 to 2008.
• The combination of full recourse mortgage loans, prepayment penalties and the absence of mortgage interest tax deductions appears to have mitigated upswings and downturns in some housing markets by increasing household risk sharing.

• Some researchers note that restrictive finance systems and the absence of tax benefits for homeownership reduce housing market volatility, but at the cost of reducing the ownership rate and household mobility.

This review has focused particularly on aspects of housing markets and finance systems that were in play during the recent financial crisis. In developing an effective housing policy, other important choices must also be made, which will reflect deeper questions of social policy. One set of choices revolves around the question of what is the optimal mix of housing tenure – or indeed, whether there is an optimum at all. Another issue relates to using housing trends as indicators of well-being because housing has a dual role as shelter and as a driver of the economy and job creation. Because a hot housing market generates jobs and wealth benefits, the temptation may be to ignore house price inflation (unlike inflation of many other goods or services) and its effects on housing affordability, while focusing instead on the positive benefits for the housing and construction sectors, as well as the economy at large. Finally, different country experiences highlight the trade-offs between tightly regulated markets, which may offer stability, and more flexible, dynamic systems that may be riskier but could provide greater opportunities for efficiency, innovation and growth.
Adjustable-rate mortgage (ARM): A mortgage where interest rates may be adjusted over the course of the loan. Generally, the frequency of adjustments will be specified in the mortgage, as will the index used to determine the adjustment level. The index and period of variability varies widely among countries.

CMHC: Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation offers mortgage insurance on residential mortgage loans.

Capital market/secondary mortgage market: The secondary mortgage market is the market for the sale and purchase of mortgage-backed securities and bonds backed by pools of mortgages. Capital markets, more generally, are markets where businesses and other entities raise long-term funds by trading financial securities.

Conforming loan: In the U.S., a conforming loan does not exceed the loan value and other limits set by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.

Fixed-rate mortgage: A mortgage where the interest rate, and generally the monthly payment, is unchanged for the life of the loan.

GHLC: Government Housing Loan Corporation (of Japan) was established in the 1950s to provide long-term capital at a low rate of interest for housing construction and purchase.

Government mortgage guarantee: A mortgage guarantee backed with the full faith and credit of the government.

HPF: Housing Provident Fund (of China) provides a stable source of financing for the lower end of the real estate market, so even as commercial loan policies are tightened, the affordable housing segment is likely to remain strong, particularly in lower tier cities.

Hybrid loan: A mortgage that combines features of fixed- and adjustable-rate mortgages. For example, a mortgage may have a fixed interest rate for a specified period (one year, five years), after which the interest rate may become fully variable or may adjust within limits specified in the mortgage document.

JHF: The Japanese Housing Finance Agency replaced the GHLC in 2007. JHF manages the remaining loans originally issued by GHLC.

Loan-to-value ratio (LTV): Ratio of the outstanding loan amount to the market value of the home. The LTV at the time the loan is made indicates the percentage of down payment made by the borrower. For example, an LTV of 80 indicates a borrower provided 20 percent equity. As home prices change and the loan gets paid down, the LTV also changes.
**Mortgage insurance:** Insurance provided by the government or private sector to ensure that mortgage payments will be met, particularly in cases of high LTV, and to compensate lenders and investors in case of default. It is a financial guaranty that reduces the risk borne by lenders.

**Negative equity:** Negative equity refers to the situation when the outstanding loan amount exceeds the value of the home.

**Noncallable bonds:** Bonds that cannot be redeemed prior to maturity date.

**Non-recourse loan:** A mortgage loan secured only by the real property, not by other assets owned by the borrower, who is not personally liable beyond the pledged collateral.

**OTC:** Over-the-counter refers to trades that occur directly between two parties rather than through an exchange system.

**Prepayment penalty:** Fee paid by mortgage holder if the mortgage is paid off prior to the completion of the loan term.

**Recourse loan:** This type of loan allows the lender to go after some or all of the borrower’s assets, depending on the mortgage contract terms, not just the real property, in the event of default by the borrower.

**Social housing:** Housing provided at reduced cost, generally to low-income households, either directly by or with subsidies from the public sector.

**Tax-deductible mortgage:** Interest payments on the mortgage loan are deductible from taxable income.

**Variable-rate mortgage:** Another term for adjustable-rate mortgage.
Endnotes

1 See discussion of factors influencing state variations in subprime and foreclosure experience, in Chapter 2 of Bardhan, Edelstein and Kroll (2011).


6 See for example the cases of Ireland and the United Kingdom in Bardhan, Edelstein and Kroll (2011).

7 See descriptions of Serbia (Šoškić et al. 2011) and Russia (Sprenger and Urošević 2011) during the economic crisis in Bardhan, Edelstein and Kroll (2011).

8 Estimates drawn from a 2001 supplemental report of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development and the U.S. Bureau of the Census indicate that approximately seven percent of all housing units had some type of subsidy (including both financing and direct rental by federal, state and local government or by non-profits). The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development reports that in 2008 roughly five million out of 132 million housing units were in national ownership or supported by federal government subsidy.


10 Reforms at the state level in the wake of the financial crisis have further reduced the opportunities for lenders to charge prepayment fees, even with subprime loans.


22 See for example Soškić et al. (2011).

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Additional References


