

EVALUATING A NUCLEAR DEAL WITH IRAN



Coming up with a nuclear deal with Iran is an immense diplomatic undertaking. There are many issues that need to be addressed, and both official and private proposals have developed different ideas of what would constitute a "good" outcome. Few of these have been publicly discussed.

LEGEND

Status of Iran's Nuclear Program

Pre-JPA ■ Status of Iran's nuclear program as of November 2013, prior to implementation of the Joint Plan of Action
JPA ■ Status of Iran's nuclear program as required by the Joint Plan of Action

Government Proposals

Congress ■ Sense of Congress contained in the Nuclear Iran Prevention Act of 2013 (H.R. 850) that passed the House of Representatives 400-20 and the Nuclear Weapon Free Iran Act of 2013 (S. 1881) that has 59 co-sponsors in the Senate
P5+1 ■ Based on confidence building proposal made by P5+1 in March 2013 and the "Elements of the final step of a comprehensive solution" contained in the JPA

Expert Proposals

Brookings ■ Based on Einhorn, Robert J. (2014, March 31), Preventing a nuclear-armed Iran: requirements for a comprehensive nuclear agreement (Foreign Policy at Brookings, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Series, Paper 10), Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution
ICG ■ Based on International Crisis Group. (2014, May, 9), Iran and the P5+1: solving the nuclear Rubik's Cube (Middle East Report No. 152), Brussels, Belgium

JINSA ■ JINSA Gemunder Center Iran Task Force. (2014, January 24), Assessment of the interim deal with Iran. New York, NY: The Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs



ELEMENTS OF A NUCLEAR WEAPON

ELEMENTS OF A NUCLEAR WEAPON

Fissile Material Production
Nuclear Weapon Design
Ballistic Missile Development


INSPECTIONS
DEAL DURATION
SIGNALING RESOLVE
SANCTIONS RELIEF

URANIUM ENRICHMENT

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FISSILE MATERIAL PRODUCTION


Number of Centrifuges Operating



Types of Centrifuges Operating

Pre-JPA	JPA	Congress	P5+1	Brookings	ICG	JINSA
IR-1	IR-1	Unspecified	Unspecified	IR-1 & IR-2M	IR-1 & IR-2M	IR-1

Number of Centrifuges Installed




Types of Centrifuges Installed

Pre-JPA	JPA	Congress	P5+1	Brookings	ICG	JINSA
2 IR-1; IR-2m	2 IR-1; IR-2m	Unspecified	Unspecified	IR-1 Possibly IR-2m	IR-1 Eventually IR-2M	IR-1

Centrifuge R&D

Pre-JPA	Experimenting with six new centrifuge models
JPA	Experimenting with six new centrifuge models
Congress	Unspecified
P5+1	Temporary suspension
Brookings	Allowed, with limits
ICG	Allowed
JINSA	None


Enrichment Facilities



Enrichment Level

Pre-JPA	JPA	Congress	P5+1	Brookings	ICG	JINSA
3.5% + 20%	< 5%	No Enrichment	< 5%	< 5%	Unspecified	< 5%

Enriched Uranium Stockpiles



Arak Heavy Water Reactor

Pre-JPA	Incomplete; construction underway
JPA	Activation and testing of reactor not allowed
Congress	Shut
P5+1	No plutonium production
Brookings	Design change to limit plutonium production
ICG	Design change to limit plutonium production
JINSA	Shut

NUCLEAR WEAPON DESIGN

Pre-JPA	IAEA is "increasingly concerned about the possible existence in Iran of undisclosed nuclear related activities involving military related organizations, including activities related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile"
JPA	Not Addressed
Congress	Ceased, dismantled, and past research explained
P5+1	Address IAEA concerns about possible military dimension
Brookings	Disclosure of (PMD)* essential, but specifics remain confidential
ICG	Disclosure of (PMD)* essential, but specifics remain confidential
JINSA	Iran "must resolve all outstanding international concerns"

* Possible Military Dimensions



BALLISTIC MISSILE DEVELOPMENT

Pre-JPA	According to IAEA, there is credible evidence of "a structured and comprehensive programme of engineering studies to examine how to integrate a new spherical payload into the existing payload chamber which would be mounted in the re-entry vehicle of the Shahab 3 missile"
JPA	Not Addressed
Congress	Ceased, dismantled, and past research explained
P5+1	Unspecified
Brookings	Must be addressed in separate agreement
ICG	5-7 years into an agreement, Iran should sign 2002 Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation
JINSA	Disclosure of information on ballistic missile research required



INSPECTIONS

Pre-JPA	Limited, Iran refused IAEA demands for enhanced inspections
JPA	More frequent inspections at enrichment facilities; access granted to five additional facilities
Congress	Accept IAEA demands for enhanced inspections
P5+1	Accept IAEA demands for enhanced inspections
Brookings	Accept IAEA demands for enhanced inspections
ICG	Accept IAEA demands for enhanced inspections
JINSA	Accept IAEA demands for enhanced inspections




DEAL DURATION

Pre-JPA	Not Applicable
JPA	6 MONTHS Possible Extension
Congress	No Expiration Date
P5+1	Unspecified
Brookings	20 YEARS Ideal But Not Likely
ICG	10 YEARS
JINSA	No Expiration Date



SIGNALING RESOLVE

Pre-JPA	Pres. Obama: "use all elements of American power to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon"
JPA	Unspecified
Congress	"It is the sense of Congress that the United States should be prepared to take all necessary measures, including military action if required, to prevent Iran from threatening the United States, its allies, or Iran's neighbors with a nuclear weapon"
P5+1	None
Brookings	Congress should provide prior authorization to use military force if Iran were to cheat
ICG	Unspecified
JINSA	Additional military deployments to the Middle East, "declaratory policy" that supports Israel's right to defend itself and emphasizes US military capabilities



SANCTIONS RELIEF

Pre-JPA	Not-Applicable
JPA	Pause efforts to further reduce Iran's crude oil sales; suspend sanctions on Iran's petrochemical exports and precious metals. Expected value: \$7 - 20 billion
Congress	Unspecified
P5+1	Relief of nuclear-related sanctions on the gold trade, petrochemical industry, and some banking restrictions
Brookings	Staggered sanctions relief culminating in the removal of all nuclear-related sanctions
ICG	Staggered sanctions relief across three distinct phases
JINSA	Staggered sanctions relief, including initial suspension rather than repeal of US sanctions