

ASSESSING THE IRAN DEAL

Elements of a Nuclear Weapon

Fissile Material Production

Uranium Enrichment

NUMBER OF CENTRIFUGES OPERATING

Congress	Administration	Framework Agreement	JCPOA
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 0 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Unspecified 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 5,060 IR-1 centrifuges at Natanz 1,040 IR-1 centrifuges at Fordow producing non-nuclear medical isotopes 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 5,060 IR-1 centrifuges at Natanz 1,040 IR-1 centrifuges installed at Fordow, of which 348 will enrich materials other than uranium, for use as medical isotopes

Types of Centrifuges Operating

Congress	Administration	Framework Agreement	JCPOA
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Unspecified 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Unspecified 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> For 10 years, only IR-1 centrifuges 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> For 10 years, only IR-1 centrifuges <i>By year eight, however, Iran will be permitted to begin building and stockpiling IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuges for eventual installation and use in its enrichment facilities</i>

Number of Centrifuges Installed

Congress	Administration	Framework Agreement	JCPOA
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Unspecified 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Unspecified 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 6,104 installed for the next ten-fifteen years <ul style="list-style-type: none"> No more than 5,060 IR-1 centrifuges at Natanz No more than 1,044 IR-1 centrifuges at Fordow Excess centrifuges will be removed to IAEA safeguarded facility 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 6,104 installed for the next ten years <ul style="list-style-type: none"> No more than 5,060 IR-1 centrifuges at Natanz No more than 1,044 IR-1 centrifuges at Fordow Excess centrifuges in both Natanz and Fordow will be removed and stored in Natanz under IAEA monitoring

<i>Centrifuge R&D</i>			
Congress	Administration	Framework Agreement	JCPOA
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Unspecified 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Temporary suspension 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> "Limited" R&D with advanced centrifuges for 10 years 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> For ten years, centrifuge R&D will limited to IR-2m, IR-4, IR-5, IR-6, IR-7 and IR-8 models But some limitations on R&D will be relaxed after 8.5 years <ul style="list-style-type: none"> For the first 10 years, Iran can test up to 10 IR-4 centrifuges and a single IR-5 at once <i>After eight and a half years, Iran can ramp up from testing a smaller number of IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuges to running as many as 30 of each</i> No stockpiling of enriched uranium produced by advanced centrifuges during R&D For 15 years, all enrichment R&D with advanced centrifuges will occur at Natanz Iran will be allowed to conduct computer modelling and simulations of new centrifuge models (beyond those specified above)
<i>Enrichment Facilities</i>			
Congress	Administration	Framework Agreement	JCPOA
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>Natanz:</i> Unspecified <i>Fordow:</i> Closed 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>Natanz:</i> Enrichment to 3.5 percent <i>Fordow:</i> Enrichment to 3.5 percent 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>Natanz:</i> Uranium enrichment <i>Fordow:</i> Production of non-nuclear medical isotopes, no uranium enrichment for 15 years 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>Natanz:</i> For 15 years, any uranium enrichment will only happen at Natanz <i>Fordow:</i> No uranium enrichment or uranium enrichment R&D at Fordow for 15 years

<i>Enrichment Level</i>			
Congress	Administration	Framework Agreement	JCPOA
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No enrichment 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <5 percent enrichment 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No enrichment over 3.5 percent 15 years 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No enrichment over 3.67 percent for 15 years
<i>Enriched Uranium Stockpiles</i>			
Congress	Administration	Framework Agreement	JCPOA
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Unspecified 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 300 kg of 3.5 percent enriched uranium, no stockpile of 20 percent enriched uranium 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 300 kg stockpile for 15 years; how excess will be eliminated remains unspecified 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> For 15 years, maximum nuclear material stockpile will be 300 kilograms of UF6 enriched up to 3.67 percent <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Excess UF6 will be sold in return for natural (unenriched) uranium or diluted Fuel rods for use in Iran’s reactors will not be counted against this total
<i>Plutonium Enrichment</i>			
Congress	Administration	Framework Agreement	JCPOA
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Arak reactor must be shut 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Arak reactor will not produce plutonium 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Arak reactor will be modified to “not produce weapons grade plutonium” Spent fuel to be shipped out of Iran; no additional heavy water reactors for 15 years “Indefinite” commitment not to engage in spent fuel reprocessing 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Arak reactor will be redesigned so it cannot produce any weapons-grade plutonium. All spent fuel rods (which could also be source material for weapons-grade plutonium) will be sent out of the country as long as this reactor exists – to a country of Iran’s choosing Iran will not be able to build a single heavy-water reactor for at least 15 years <i>Iran will not engage in spent fuel reprocessing or R&D into such activities for 15 years</i>

NUCLEAR WEAPON DESIGN

Congress	Administration	Framework Agreement	JCPOA
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Must be ceased, dismantled, and Iran must disclose its past research 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Iran must address IAEA concerns about possible military dimensions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Iran will implement an unspecified "agreed set of measures" to address IAEA concerns 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Iran pledges to answer all outstanding questions the IAEA has about the possible military dimension (PMD) of Iran's nuclear program and research by October 15, 2015 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The IAEA would issue its assessment of these answers by December 15, 2015 Deal does not contain consequences for if Iran fails to meet this deadline or the IAEA finds its answers unsatisfactory Iran is prohibited from engaging in nuclear weapons research

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEVELOPMENT

Congress	Administration	Framework Agreement	JCPOA
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Must be ceased, dismantled, and Iran must disclose its past research 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Unspecified 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Unaddressed 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Unaddressed

INSPECTIONS

Congress	Administration	Framework Agreement	JCPOA
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Iran must accept IAEA demands for increased inspections 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Iran must accept IAEA demands for increased inspections 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Iran will implement Additional Protocol, grant inspectors access to "suspicious sites," allow real time monitoring of uranium and centrifuge facilities for 20 – 25 years, and provide early notification of new nuclear facilities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Iran will voluntarily submit to the IAEA Additional Protocol as well as another measure known as the modified Code 3.1 of the Safeguard Agreement IAEA monitoring will include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Daily access to declared facilities, including uranium mines and mills,

			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ centrifuge assembly plants, and enrichment facilities ○ A long-term IAEA presence in Iran <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Up to 150 IAEA inspectors in the country, including Americans (who were previously barred) ○ IAEA monitoring of uranium ore produced by Iran for 25 years ○ Surveillance of centrifuge construction for 20 years ○ A mechanism to ensure speedy resolution of IAEA access concerns for 15 years ● <i>IAEA will not have immediate access to suspicious sites, would need Iranian consent which might require an arbitration process lasting as long as 54 days</i>
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DEAL DURATION

Congress	Administration	Framework Agreement	JCPOA
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● No expiration date 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Unspecified 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Provisions in place for a minimum of 10 years 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● <i>Some limitations begin to lapse as early as eight years in</i> ● All significant nuclear restrictions lifted within 10 – 15 years

SIGNALING RESOLVE

Congress	Administration	Framework Agreement	JCPOA
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● "It is the sense of Congress that the United States should be prepared to take all necessary 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Unspecified 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● "All previous UNSC sanctions can be reimposed" 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Joint Commission established to rule on disputes in a 35 day-long arbitration process. ● UNSC would then take up the issue, voting on a resolution to continue lifting sanctions

<p>measures, including military action if required, to prevent Iran from threatening the United States, its allies, or Iran's neighbors with a nuclear weapon."</p>			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ If resolution fails or is not passed within 30 days, UNSC sanctions are re-imposed ○ <i>UNSC sanctions cannot be reimposed on contracts signed during the time when sanctions were lifted</i>
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SANCTIONS RELIEF

Congress	Administration	Framework Agreement	JCPOA
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Unspecified 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Relief of sanctions on the gold trade, petrochemical industry, and some banking restrictions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • U.S. and Iranian understandings of the framework revealed major differences of understanding in the timing and scope of sanctions relief <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Iran asserted that "all" UNSC, EU, and U.S. sanctions would be lifted, and that relief would be granted upfront ○ The United States asserted that only "nuclear-related" sanctions would be suspended, upon Iran addressing "key" concerns 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • All UNSC resolutions will be terminated at the moment that the IAEA verifies Iranian implementation of the deal • <i>After 10 years, UNSC and EU sanctions will be fully lifted and can no longer be re-imposed</i> • The United States will suspend enforcement of relevant sanctions at the moment that the IAEA verifies Iranian implementation of the deal and terminate certain Executive Orders <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ <i>Sanctions to be lifted include some that could be contested as non-nuclear</i> ○ The United States will allow for sale of commercial aircraft, parts and service to Iran ○ <i>After five years, the conventional arms embargo on Iran will be lifted</i>

			<ul style="list-style-type: none">○ No later than eight years after the deal's adoption, the United States will terminate all sanctions on Iran prohibiting it from important sensitive nuclear technology and ballistic missile components• Re-imposing Sanctions: Iran will treat any re-imposition of lifted sanctions or imposition of new nuclear-related sanctions as a reason to stop complying with the deal
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Discrepancies between the framework and the final agreement.