



BIPARTISAN POLICY CENTER

SPECIAL PRESENTATION

THREAT ASSESSMENT PRESS CONFERENCE

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MR. MICHAEL ALLEN: Welcome everybody. I'm Michael Allen of the Bipartisan Policy Center. I'm project director of Congressman Hamilton and Governor Kean's National Security Preparedness Group whose mission is to oversee the implementation of the 9/11 Commission recommendations and to study other national security issues. We're housed at the Bipartisan Policy Center which was founded by former Senate Majority Leaders Mitchell, Daschle, Dole and Baker to promote bipartisan solutions to the nation's problems.

I'd like to introduce Governor Kean to introduce the report and the panelists. Thank you.

FORMER GOV. TOM KEAN (R-NJ): Thank you, Michael. And good morning. We're here again preparing for another anniversary of 9/11, preparing to mourn with the families, to look at what happened in the past, to remember, but also to look forward. And part of that looking forward is to reassess what the threat is today, how we're doing. Are we doing any better than we were before and has the threat changed in any way? And that's what we want to talk about today.

This is a very important time to reassess, to reexamine, to look at what this threat is. And the group that we've formed sort of a successive 9/11 Commission, we have met now with all the leaders of national security in this administration. We've heard from people who've led national security efforts in the past who were trying to formulate what the country should do, what we should be aware of and where we should go.

And in that context, this is a very important day. This report we'll present here today is looking forward, is looking at how the threat has changed and the kind of things that we may have to do and the ways in which we have to change as a nation in order to meet that threat.

At this point, I'd like to introduce my partner, my friend, one of the Washington's other national monument, Lee Hamilton who has been so instrumental in national security and in so many other in this town. And, Lee, if you'll take it from here.

FORMER REP. LEE HAMILTON (D-IN): Good morning to all of you. Thank you very much for coming. Good to be with Governor Kean again as we have conducted a good many of these over a period of several years. I step forward simply because I want to recognize the members of the National Security Preparedness Group.

We will turn to Bruce Hoffman in just a moment. He and Peter Bergen are the two key players. They are the ones that with Steve Flynn's help have put together this report. And I know you want to hear from Bruce. I think Bruce intends to summarize the

report briefly and then he, John and Steve will take your questions and Tom and I will chip in if we can.

We've assembled I think a remarkable group of people with regard to their backgrounds in national security and homeland security. They are a real group of experts. John Gannon is one of the members. He's here today. He's had a very long and distinguished career in the intelligence community and now works at BAE Systems. He's one of their trusted advisers.

Our group included Fran Townsend who, of course, worked in the White House on homeland security matters. It includes the former secretary of DHS, governor of Pennsylvania Tom Ridge, also includes former energy Secretary Spencer Abraham. We have two former attorney generals in the group, Dick Thornburgh and Ed Meese and we have several members of – former members of Congress, Jim Turner, Dave McCurdy and Dan Glickman. If you put all these people together, I think you've got a pretty good group to assess where our government stands with regard to national security preparedness.

We believe that this assessment that is being released today – and Bruce will describe to you in just a few minutes – is a very important document. I don't think I've seen anything quite like it. I haven't seen all the things that come out of government but I've seen a good many of them and you will see that it gives a very fresh perspective on the threat that we confront from al Qaeda.

So our focus today is on this paper and the evolving threat from al Qaeda. In the future, we will explore other aspects of homeland security and national security preparedness but today the focus will be on the report. So Bruce, to get us into this report, we ask you to step forward and give us a summary.

MR. BRUCE HOFFMAN: Thank you, Lee. Before I begin, let me first thank very warmly and appreciatively the Bipartisan Center and especially the executive director of this effort, Michael Allen, whose support throughout this entire project was absolutely critical and essential. And also, I'd like to thank the other members of the group, co-chaired extremely ably and effectively by Governor Kean and Congressman Hamilton.

Now, unfortunately, my coauthor, Peter Bergen, isn't here. And this report clearly benefited from Peter who's not only perhaps the world's leading expert on al Qaeda and has indeed not only written the book but has written two books on Osama bin Laden but he's also a magnificent editor who himself greatly improved this product.

I have to say to any of you that are familiar with either Peter or my work can very easily disentangle the DNA of each of us. We came at it from two different perspectives but actually complemented one another and supplemented by the expertise from the group I think really produced something that is rather important.

It also wouldn't have been possible without the assistance of Katherine Tiedemann of the New America Foundation who actually took what Peter and I had written, melded it together, and then, during successive iterations as we took input from other members of the group came out with this document that you have before you.

Now rather than go through – summarize the entire – 42-page document would actually take some time to summarize. Let me instead zero in briefly on what I think are really the key, the most important conclusions or findings from it and also put in some context the work that we did.

First, we started from the assumption that it's been six, often six long years since the 9/11 Commission released their report and we thought that it was appropriate to do a complete threat assessment, a new net assessment of the threat.

Also, I think significantly, it's been three long years as well since the last publicly disseminated U.S. government threat assessment, and this was the "National Intelligence Estimate" produced by the National Intelligence Council in July 2007.

So the group thought it was enormously important before we began the rest of our work of making recommendations to establish a foundation or a baseline assessment of the threat as it exists today but even more importantly, how it's evolved and changed in the time since both the 9/11 Commission's report and then the National Intelligence Assessment from three years ago.

We had, very fortunately, wide access to an array of senior policymakers across the United States government who were open and frank with us and generously offered us their thoughts and their opinions and this, of course, was supplemented in turn by the ongoing research that Peter Bergen and I separately have been conducting on this phenomenon.

Our fundamental conclusion is that the threat has both diversified and become much more complex than it has been at any time since the attacks on September 11th, 2001.

Equally I think of concern is the fact that there is no single profile of the terrorists threatening the United States today. What we see is an adversary that in essence has drawn from all sectors of society and all walks of life. These include persons born in Afghanistan, Egypt, Pakistan, and Somalia residents in the United States, in many cases naturalized American citizens.

But also, in the past few years, what we've seen increasingly is American citizens themselves, people born in the United States, also gravitating, also being summoned to the clarion call of terrorism and, in this case, jihad.

We discovered that the perpetrators or the people plotting either to commit terrorist acts in this country or to travel overseas to receive training in terrorists acts were

both young and old, male and female, married and unmarried, had children, didn't have children, they were well educated. Some of them, like Faisal Shahzad had MBAs, masters of business administration. Others were high school dropouts or jail birds or ex-cons.

We encountered people that were self-described as “petite, blue-eyed blonde who could easily blend in,” close quote – that was, of course, how Colleen LaRose, also known as Jihad Jane, described herself – as well as hardened terrorist operatives such as the Chicago and David Headley whose reconnaissance was instrumental in the success of the November 2008 Mumbai attacks staged by Lashkar-e-Taiba, a close ally of al Qaeda. And subsequently was continuing to carry out reconnaissance using the United States as a base for future terrorist attacks both on behalf of al Qaeda, other Pakistani jihadi groups as well as Lashkar-e-Taiba.

We also found that the leadership of these terrorist movements that threaten the United States is becoming increasingly Americanized. What do I mean by that?

Key operatives, whether it's someone like Adnan Shukrijumah, an al Qaeda central, whether it's someone like Anwar al-Awlaki, an al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, or whether it's someone like Omar Hammami in al-Shabaab, the Somali ally of al Qaeda, what we see is increasingly Americans – all three of them are born in the United States – turning on their country, going abroad, making common cause with terrorist groups and that is something we found fundamentally disquieting.

Finally, we concluded that the attacks and plots of the past year or so are not and should not be regarded as one-offs, as we were often told. Rather we see them as part of a broader strategy embraced by our adversaries, by al Qaeda, its affiliates and associates to flood us in essence with multiple threats from a diverse array of adversaries.

We found too that the United States has failed to adequately understand and prepare for these threats. There was a prevailing conviction that existed long past its shelf life that it couldn't happen here, that the communities in the United States from which terrorists, we thought, would draw their recruits, we regarded as more affluent, better educated and more diverse than similar communities elsewhere, particularly in the United Kingdom and Europe. And that therefore, the American melting pot would provide something of a firewall to prevent radicalization and recruitment in this country, yet this hasn't proven to be the case and now we are confronted with an alarming trend.

The threat, we concluded, is more complex, more diverse than what we've encountered at any time since September 11th, 2001.

An important challenge that we discovered is that there is no single government agency responsible for identifying radicalization and interdicting recruitment. The problem is, if it's everyone's responsibility, in the end it's no one's.

Moreover, we found it's not even clear which agency amongst the vast array of agencies in the intelligence and law enforcement community in the United States, which agency should have the lead responsibility for countering radicalization and recruitment. Thus, terrorists may have found our Achilles' heel. We have no strategy to deal with this growing problem and emergent threat.

The diversity of this array of recent terrorist recruits thus present new and even greater challenges to the intelligence community and law enforcement agencies across the country who are already overstressed and inundated with the information leads and who now have to rundown this new panoply of threats coming from multiple dimensions and a variety of actors and organizations.

In some – and let me conclude here – we found that the threat facing the United States is different than it was nine years ago. It has also changed and evolved profoundly since the 9/11 Commission presented its report six long years ago.

Today, America faces as dynamic threat that is diversified to a broad, potential array of attacks from shootings to car bombs, to simultaneous suicide attacks, to attempted in-flight bombings of passenger aircraft. And that this is a state of affairs, that as we approach the ninth anniversary of the September 11th attacks is cause for concern. Thank you very much.

MR. STEPHEN FLYNN: Thank you. I'm Stephen Flynn, the president of the Center for National Policy and I'm delighted to have been able to be a part of this very distinguished panel and work with Bruce and Peter Bergen who've, I think, provided us with such a superb report.

Just a couple of things I'd like to highlight, particularly from a homeland security perspective about what I think we should infer from their key finding.

They've given us a very uncomfortable finding, I think as uncomfortable for the American people but also for our national security and intelligence community as well, that al Qaeda and its affiliates and increasingly others who are drawn to this cause have essentially made a significant strategic shift away from the spectacular attacks like we saw in September 11th and a consensus that many of us had in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 which is to equal or better that attack to one where basically less is more.

A less sophisticated attack conducted more frequently can have as big of a bang for less buck than a real spectacular attack.

What that means in very straightforward terms is that the bar for carrying out these attacks is much lower. You don't need as highly capable people. You don't need to put together a very sophisticated conspiracy.

The more sophisticated attacks have an upside that their complexity often trips wires off that allows us to intercept them. Much smaller scale attacks, particularly drawn

from domestic recruits are almost impossible for our national security intelligence community as is currently constructed to detect and intercept. As a practical matter, it means that we will almost certainly have successful terrorist attacks on U.S. soil and we need to start coming to grips with that.

And the important finding here as well is they're not likely to be 9/11 scale. We're going to see the kinds of things that we saw most recently in New York in Times Square with Faisal Shahzad, an American naturalized citizen who, drawn to the cause, gets training overseas and comes back, leaves Bridgeport, Connecticut, and drives into New York City.

I think one of the most important things about the Times Square event was that Times Square is arguably the most visibly (privileged ?) place in the United States with perhaps the exception of the White House, yet the detection of Shahzad's scheme was done by a T-shirt vendor on the corner.

Literally – one of the folks we did speak with in this panel was with Commissioner Ray Kelly of the NYPD. Literally across the street, on Broadway and 32nd was a squad car. That wasn't the detection point. It was an everyday citizen who detected the problem.

Fundamentally, our national security apparatus and our intelligence community have been operating on, we will focus all our energy and efforts on dealing with an adversary away from our shores so essentially we, Americans, can go about our daily lives confident that this threat is not going to be on our shores.

I think the central finding, again, of this report is that that's not how the threat is today. It's evolved much more with a domestic component. It still has the overseas pieces but it also speaks very much that our national security apparatus and intelligence community are not as adapting as much as they need to for this threat. Minimally, we're talking obviously engagements of potentially up to 50,000 public safety agencies who are going to be the frontlines of this kind of threat but more importantly perhaps is the everyday citizens.

The Christmas Day bomber attack was not stopped by a federal air marshal. It was stopped by the passengers aboard that plane. The Times Square incident, again, was not stopped by our national security or local law enforcement. It was detected by a T-shirt vendor who alerted local law enforcement and that was very central for going after him afterwards.

The bottom line here is the threat is much different today than it was nine years ago. Our national security and intelligence community needs to adapt to that but we, the American people, must as well.

So I really want to commend the work of Bruce Hoffman and Peter Bergen and again, the opportunity that I've had to be a part of this panel to bring this very important

finding, I think, to the American people and hope that we take some action soon. Thank you.

MR. : Thank you. I want to join in the applause for this paper and compliment Peter Bergen and Bruce Hoffman on what I think is a very thoughtful, insightful and provocative piece of work that I hope will stimulate a larger public debate on the important issues that it raises.

As someone who spent most of my adult life in the intelligence community and in the analytic world, I'd focus on the issue of radicalization and just point out that in my experience, radicalization is really a function of globalization. And we all know that our adversaries have a much easier time in the era of globalization in moving people and moving finance and moving capabilities and destructive know-how across borders.

Well, I think this paper makes it clear that they also move cultural information across borders and cultural information not just from the places we'd expect it, in the Middle East and South Asia, but into Western societies and into our own. I think the imperative that comes from this is to recognize that we need to have analysis that integrates foreign and domestic intelligence and analysis more than at any time in our history. And this is an absolutely imperative for us if we're going to deal with the issue of radicalization.

I think the paper also makes clear that intelligence analysis is not just a matter of taking human intelligence and imagery analysis and sending those to intelligence and pulling it together but it's much more important today if we're to understand the nature of terrorism to pull cultural information and to put cultural information in that context, into the analysis that we do. And that means understanding the cultures from which the terrorists come but also our own culture and how it is becoming susceptible to radicalization.

We're going to have – I'm delighted to tell you that on the sixth of October, the NSPG is going to be sponsoring a conference on domestic intelligence at the Willard Hotel and that DNI, the new DNI, Jim Clapper, will be there along with the FBI Director Bob Mueller and other leaders of the intelligence community. And we're going to follow on some of the discussion that this paper raised. And I look forward to that and I hope to have a number of you join us for that conference. Thank you.

GOV. KEAN: Okay. At this point, we'd be glad to answer any and all of your questions.

Q: Pam Benson with CNN. You mentioned there's no one organization responsible for looking at the domestic threat and handling it. Some might think that that would have been the role of DHS. Where does the responsibility lie? What would you recommend in terms of how this should be conducted?

MR. HOFFMAN: That is the subject of the next report, to put it simply. We thought that this report stood on its own and actually this report turned out to be far more weighty than we imaged it would be and decided that the group really needs to focus its attention for the next few months on precisely those recommendations having identified the problems. It doesn't mean we duck the answer but it's just not something we deliberately at this juncture considered.

Q: Hi. Tom Frank from *USA Today*. I'd like to ask two questions about commercial aviation. The report lists commercial aviation as the number one threat. Question one: why is that still the case, especially given that the attacks on mass transit in Madrid, London, Moscow? And secondly, how effective have the efforts been both since 9/11 and more recently with advanced imaging technology to stop the kind of threats that you write about?

MR. HOFFMAN: The problem I think is that our adversaries, despite all the advances we've made, all the technological sophistication, the reorganization of part of our government to address the threat to commercial aviation – they're not deterred from attacking. They see this as fundamentally a high value target, a target that they believe not only can generate a mother load of publicity and attention, but also one that stokes worldwide fear that radiates beyond just the target of the attack or the target nation of the attack that has a profound impact on globalized economy, on international travel.

And one of the things we talk about in the report is that al Qaeda in particular, but also we see many of its allies and affiliates, focus on economic targets because they believe that's fundamentally how they win. I mean, they don't claim they're going to defeat us on the battlefield and they understand the fundamental asymmetry of terrorism – that they can't hope to defeat the United States militarily.

Instead, they seek to bankrupt us and our allies. And they see one of the key vehicles to doing so is targeting commercial aviation because of the throttle, travel throttle aviation, aviation travel throttle commerce as well can cause the paralysis that we – or at least they hope it will again cause the paralysis that we saw in the weeks after 9/11.

But your question goes right to the heart of the report in fact. And this is I think the main challenge that we face in countering this threat, is the threat doesn't come from one adversary in one place with one set or one toolbox of capabilities. Rather, what we see is a variety of adversaries with different capabilities that each pose off a unique and separate threat.

So we have to, in effect, unfortunately, as we go into the second decade of the 21st century, we have to cover the waterfront. We have to be as flexible and adaptive in responding to threats, precisely as you said, on metros, on subways, on buses that we know are vulnerable and we've seen have been vulnerable in other countries, as well as to an adversary that still persists in going back to the same target set because of the value they see in having catastrophic impact from that type of attack.

MR. FLYNN: If I can maybe follow up. I think the key here is that the data tells us that commercial aviation continues to be a target and there continues to be planning there, but again, reinforcing what Bruce just said. A core finding of this is nine years later, the adversary has – in the strategy has adapted significantly. So these other areas, other transportation modes, but other parts of the critical infrastructure remain very much, I think, in the crosshairs of not just the current generation of terrorists, but future terrorists because the expectation is by targeting these, they can get a big bang for their buck. And a lot of that comes from how we react in the aftermath of these events.

So a core issue that remains is if we have an attack on something like a mass transit system and our current efforts are shown as wanting, then we get the political reaction often with very expensive kinds of – and not often very well thought out cures that continue to motivate. I think that's another in here is that to some extent the strategy has adapted because they are motivated by how we react to actual terrorism. And so if we basically do very expensive things or very destructive things to our economy or to our civil liberties, that's a motivator. So another key thing, I think, we're going to be looking at as a panel is how, given that we cannot prevent every act of terror as they go to sort of the less is more approach, how we do much better as a country managing terrorist attacks when they happen if they take on these various other modes of transportation.

Q: Body scanners would be put in airports all over the country and the world, is this just security theater or is this actually helping?

MR. FLYNN: We did not as a panel look at that. I've looked at these issues for a long time. There is no question that the impulse after and underwear bomber was to put things out there that would reassure the flying public. I think there's more studies that need to be done about whether those tools are going to work effectively or that the threat simply isn't going to morph in another direction that we need other tools for. So, no, this was not entirely well thought out when it was executed and that's part of the problem. We often react in ways that need more – look, there're clearly advantages to those tools, but they also have their limitations.

GOV. KEAN: Yes, I might just say one more thing. The technology is going to continue to change on both sides. They found a new kind of plastic that was undetectable as an explosive. They used it to try and assassinate the head of the intelligence for the Saudi Arabian government, the prince. And he told us all about it. We didn't react. The next thing was the so-called "underpants bomber," who used that to try to bring down a plane. So we're going to keep on jumping on the technology side. They'll try to come up with new things. We'll try to counter those new things. In the meantime, our best defense is always still going to be the flying public who spots things on an airplane, who bring things to people's attention. And we have to keep people absolutely alert because they, in the end, are probably our best defense.

REP. HAMILTON: I'm not sure we have said yet, but I just want to make sure. The word "dangerous" has not been used here yet. We have said that these attacks are

more diverse, but I'm not sure we have used the word "dangerous." We consider the threat still serious and dangerous. And I think that's important that the American people not get complacent.

One of the more interesting paragraphs or two in the report for me was on page four, where we state that this year – this past year was a watershed in terrorist attacks and plots in the United States. Ten jihad attacks, jihad inspired plots or efforts by Americans to travel overseas to obtain terrorist training. Two actual attacks, three serious but disrupted plots, five incidents involving groups of Americans conspiring to travel abroad to receive training. By our count, in 2009, 43 American citizens or residents were charged with terrorism. Now, that really brought me up when I read that paragraph. And the idea, to the extent that the American people have it, that this is fading into the past, that's just flat wrong. Take a look at page four.

Q: Suzanne Spaulding. You have provided a very important and useful assessment of the nature of the threat. And picking up on your last point, Chairman Hamilton, the balance between complacency – warning against complacency and making sure that you don't create the kind of fear that undermines resiliency and brings the sort of reaction that might fuel terrorist propaganda is a very delicate one. I'm wondering if you had an opportunity to assess the scale of the threat.

Bruce talked about the adversaries wishing to flood the United States with a series of smaller attacks. But in terms of the actual scale, in terms of numbers, are you suggesting that American people should be afraid now, should be nervous that their neighbors – there are thousands and thousands of sleeper cells of terrorists in this country and they should be worried about their neighbors. Or have you had an opportunity to assess the scale of the threat inside the United States?

REP. HAMILTON: I think your question is very, very good and sets out the dilemma that you confront. You don't want to scare people and you don't want to throw them into a panic. And we don't mean to do that by this report. It's my perception – could be wrong about this – that the American people have kind of lost their focus on the threat. And I think one of the values of this report is that it brings the threat more into perspective, still serious and still dangerous.

The American people just have to get a more realistic sense of what they're confronted with. I think Steve said a moment ago, did you not, Steve, that you anticipate – I think most of us, too – that one of these attacks, some day, will succeed. And the American people have to be prepared for that and resilient to it.

So the balance that you strike in your question is very hard to hit, hard for the American leaders to hit it right. We're trying to do the best we can to say, "don't forget about this, don't be complacent, don't panic." But there's a lot of things we still need to do to make our country safer.

Q: I'm Carolyn Presutti with Voice of America TV – sorry – handed me the mike. Anyway, with regards to that home-grown terrorism, can anyone speak toward why it is occurring, why we're seeing an increase that way you mentioned on page four in the report?

GOV. KEAN: Why is it increasing – Bruce, you can take it, if you want to. I'd say the internet, the idea of the ability of – again, the world is flat according to Tom Friedman, things happening all over the world. These people can recruit on the internet. Some of them are very charismatic and they seem to be able to speak particularly to young and impressionable people who happen to be Muslims. That's certainly one factor.

Second, I think is a change of strategy, as the report points out. And I think al Qaeda is trying to do this because they've been unsuccessful in doing the big threat which they like to, they decided they can disrupt us this way. And so it's a change in strategy. I'm sure there're other reasons certainly.

REP. HAMILTON: One of the things stated in the report is important. We've been talking about change in the way this has evolved. I think that's all correct. One thing's not changed: intent. We know the intent of those who wish to do us harm. What may have changed, we think has changed is the capability of them to attack us. But they're still after us. They still want to do us harm. And they still want to get at us any way they can in our view. Intent is the driving force here behind the terrorist activity. And it remains the same.

MR. HOFFMAN: I think Governor Kean and Congressman Hamilton are absolutely right. The internet has of course played a big part, I think. What we've seen is terrorist organizations becoming much more comfortable in their communications, in many cases someone like Anwar al-Awlaki, who's born in the United States, who can communicate with people not in overly theoretical or a – (inaudible) – manner, but nonetheless has the theological credentials of a religious scholar, but grew up in New Mexico, understands American slang, understands – he's charismatic. He understands how to reach out to people. So that's one reason.

I think another important reason is what also the report talks about and I hadn't addressed to my overview, is that fact that the threat has radiated outwards from just al Qaeda central itself. It used to be that if you wanted to be a terrorist or you wanted to receive terrorist training, there was in essence one central point that you went to, generally Afghanistan and more recently Pakistan, where of course the rump remaining al Qaeda command is located.

One of the problems, I think, is part of al Qaeda strategy to enlist, to encourage, to motivate, to animate likeminded Jihadi to similarly rise up and also spread their wings, go beyond the previous local or very parochial agendas they once had. But even to contemplate operations in Europe and even in the United States has meant that individuals looking to receive terrorist training, unfortunately, today have more

destinations they can select to go to. We've had incidents just in the past months of individuals attempting, for instance, to go to Somalia rather than Pakistan. There've been, unfortunately, several incidents now, not just the Christmas Day plot that emanated from Yemen, but also Abdulhakim Muhammad, the former Carlos Bledsoe, in June, 2008, murdered one U.S. military recruiter and seriously injured another one in Little Rock, Arkansas. And he'd left the United States, gone to Yemen, and then returned to this country and engaged in violence.

So that's one of the problems is as we said the threat has diversified, not only in terms of the profile of adversaries in the United States itself, but also in terms of the number of groups in addition to al Qaeda who are independent, but in many cases have made common cause with al Qaeda, who also threaten us.

Q: I'm surprised in all of this discussion about why and motivation the issue of U.S. policy doesn't come up and isn't it a motivating factor for new recruits our policies in Afghanistan and Iraq, unconditional support for Israel, the use of drones that killed so many civilians, the bases the U.S. has all over the world that was mentioned by Osama bin Laden as one of the reasons for the original attack, and now I would say the rise of Islamophobia in the United States. Can you talk about these motivations and what we can do policy wise to stop the threat?

REP. HAMILTON: We made a very conscious decision on this report. Originally, I think we thought we would present you the report very much as you have seen it, and then add to it a number of policy recommendations. We rejected that because we thought the important thing was to focus on the assessment of the threat as stated in the report. And we wanted more time, frankly, to formulate policy recommendations. But your question clearly kind of predicts, in effect, what we have to do now. We've got the assessment of the threat. And now we have to figure out really what kind of policy recommendations.

There are sentences. There are paragraphs in the report which suggest some of our future recommendations. For example, you can clearly see by reading our report that we're going to put a lot more emphasis on state and local police forces. We didn't articulate that, but I'm sure we will in the future. So we backed away from policy here, but we were not quite ready to address that.

Q: Jason – (inaudible) – with ABC News, a question along similar lines. One of the key recommendations in the 9/11 Commission report was that the United States needs to engage and win the struggle of ideas. That has almost come to almost a complete standstill at this point. There's very serious controversies and debate here in this country, taking place over the – both the Ground Zero Islamic center and the situation in Florida. I'm just wondering how you see that in your perspectives and recommendations that you made over five years ago at this time and what more can be done.

REP. HAMILTON: Chapter 12.

GOV. KEAN: Yes, Chapter 12, Lee says. (Laughter.) It's – no, you're absolutely right. We – looking at all our recommendations, we know that most of them have been implemented, at least in part. Some of them are implemented in greater part. Some of them we want to see more action on. We established the director of national intelligence. We'd like to see that position still strengthen, given the full support of the president. We're better on communications. We're not there, yet. The recommendation involving congressional oversight has not been implemented at all and we think that's a glaring failure.

And recommendations involving foreign policy and the war on ideas, we're not there yet. It doesn't mean we don't have to continue to work on it. It doesn't mean huge blowing up issues of hostile actions among American citizens based on ideas, particularly ideas that interpret around many to be anti-Muslim are not helpful and are in fact harmful. These kinds of issues and these kinds of debates do not help when we're trying to prevent people from being recruited. And they do not help – I don't think – in the war on ideas.

REP. HAMILTON: I agree, of course, with Tom. And I'd simply say that I think the American relationship with the Islamic world is one of the really great foreign policy challenges of the next decades. We're not going to solve it in a year or two or five or even 10 years. And the kind of debates we're having today in New York City, in Florida, and other places reflect that. How do we get right? How do we line up this relationship better than we've been able to do? I don't know whether we'll get into that.

I jokingly said in response to your question, look at one of the chapters in the now ancient 9/11 Commission report, but it addresses this whole question of how you should approach the Islamic world. Incidentally, that chapter has had considerable impact in the foreign policy community in the sense that it has stimulated an enormous amount of work and thought about how to go at it. I must say, I don't think it's been implemented very effectively at this point, but I am encouraged by the fact that we are beginning to address this key relationship.

One point three or four, whatever it is, billion Muslims from London to Jakarta, an enormously important force in the world, and we have to understand it much, much better than we do and how to address it.

MR. FLYNN: If I might add that I think one of the clear implications of the finding that we're more likely to have increasingly domestic related terrorism attacks and that these are extremely difficult to prevent, and so I'm certainly we'll have one be successful, this is – there's a lot of domestic policy issues that need to be really thrashed out that we largely postponed in the aftermath of 9/11 because we treated this as primarily a foreign policy, national security beyond a sure sets of challenges. So I guess I can try to draw any silver lining out of the current very heated debate. It is that we're engaging civil society around these hard questions. I think the real key is for political leadership to not exploit this in near terms, but really use it as an opportunity to get the

American people engaged around the challenge, but fundamentally how we safeguard our core liberties and values in the context of this threat going forward.

There should not be any sort of sense of tradeoff. You want more security, you give up more liberty. Resilience is about being able to safeguard those liberties in the context of a threat. And we, as a society, have to engage around how we do that. And that's, I think, a set of policy challenges that will be different from those that the commission six years ago looked at.

GOV. KEAN: We have one more question.

Q: Gretchen Gailey of Fox News. Mr. Hoffman, you said before that the melting pot theory no longer works. Why has that changed? And also you mentioned that there's no single profile for potential terrorists, but aren't they all Muslim radicals?

MR. HOFFMAN: Well, I think, first of all the melting pot – I think it was more wishful thinking that somehow we could be insulated from the heady currents of radicalization and declaring calls to battle that we've seen affected communities in other parts of the world, particularly in the United Kingdom, but in Spain, in Belgium, Germany, and so on. And that in the end we found up we weren't different. And that in essence also comes back to the question about policies.

In some cases, you have countries that either do not participate in the invasion of Iraq, that may not have forces in Afghanistan, that have removed their forces from both countries, and still are under threat, still face attacks. So I'm not sure it necessarily it all boils down to foreign policy. I think it's more complex than that. Don't forget, too, 1998, the United States did not have troops in either Iraq or Afghanistan and in fact were superintending perhaps the greatest advances we'd ever had in the Palestinian-Israeli peace process. And that was exactly when bin Laden was blowing up our embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. So I don't think they have any shortage of issues to gravitate towards or to sort of bang the drums to summon people to.

But yes, in one respect through the other, we are talking about people for one particular demographic group that a variety of reasons, again, have somehow been infected, infused, have been responsive to, in some cases theological justifications, in some cases just the concede of young men pumped up with testosterone, in other cases feeling it's their duty to defend their brother and their religious – (inaudible) – can elsewhere. And I think the fundamental issue was that people from a wide variety of walks of life have become much more susceptible to these calls, in part because the war on terrorism has now lasted nine years, longer than World War II, for example. And therefore they found more fertile ground for recruitment. And indeed, as we said earlier, I think their messages and their means of recruiting people, using a diverse array of lures have also become much more effective, unfortunately.

In point of fact, what we say in the report is the United States, in essence, has caught up with Europe. This is a problem that especially since the July 7th, 2005, suicide

attacks on the London underground, Britain has grappled with. Britain, before those attacks also thought they could remain immune or aloof to this. They thought the problem existed on the continent where communities were less well integrated. And they were surprised on July 7th, 2005 – and this goes back to Suzanne's question.

Our point isn't to sound that alarm bell or to be alarmists. We're still talking about small numbers, 10 or 11 plots. Forty-three persons, I think is disturbingly large only because it was zero only a few years ago. United States Department of Justice indicted more than two dozen persons on terrorist charges last year. That's our point is that if we fail to take action, if we don't recognize that this is an emerging problem and a growing threat, then in a few years it will be cause for alarm, but right now is the time to look at the threat as it is unfolding, to understand that it's one that's exceptionally dynamic, and to accept that what worked yesterday and what we did yesterday or even today against this threat is no longer sufficient. That we have to be just as dynamic and just as flexible as we're finding our adversaries are.

REP. HAMILTON: Thank you very much.

(END)